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Actual Innocence after Friedman
v. Rehal: The Second Circuit
Pursues a New Mechanism for
Seeking Justice in Actual
Innocence Cases
Jonathan M. Kirshbaum*
Introduction
In the 1980s, a “moral panic” swept across the United
States as a result of incendiary allegations of mass sexual
abuse of children at schools and day care centers.1 “The media
sensationalized these [cases], generating a national perception
that sex rings were widespread and had infiltrated average
communities.”2 Many scholars now believe, however, that these
cases represented “a modern-day „witch hunt.‟”3 In fact, of the
seventy-two convictions associated with these cases, almost all
were later overturned.4
At the height of this nationwide frenzy, Jesse Friedman
and his father were accused of abusing several dozen young
boys in computer classes that they taught in the basement of
their home in Great Neck, New York.5 But there was no
* The Author is a senior appellate counsel at the Center for Appellate
Litigation where he is Co-Coordinator of the office‟s Federal Litigation Unit.
He is also an adjunct assistant clinical professor at Brooklyn Law School. He
writes about habeas corpus matters at habeascorpusblog.com. He would like
to thank all of the members of Pace Law Review for their fine work in editing
the Article. He would also like to thank his wife, Fuyu, for her patience and
understanding as he worked on this Article.
1. Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing eight
cases from around the country).
2. Id. at 155 (citing Devil Worship: Exposing Satan’s Underground
(Geraldo Rivera, NBC television broadcast Oct. 25, 1988)).
3. Id. at 156.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 146.
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physical evidence of abuse.6 The accusations stemmed purely
from information that detectives gathered in interviews with
the victims.7 The methods used by the detectives to gain these
admissions, however, have always been subject to question.8
Now the “consensus within the social science community” is
that aggressive investigatory techniques—similar to those used
in the Friedman case—“can induce false reports.”9 Despite the
questionable nature of the evidence, Jesse pled guilty to the
abuse.10
Many years after the conviction, an extraordinary series of
events occurred that resulted in the Nassau County district
attorney‟s office agreeing to re-investigate the case. The chain
reaction began with the production of the critically-acclaimed
documentary Capturing the Friedmans.11 The movie depicts the
accusations of abuse, the ensuing investigations, the impact of
the case on the Friedman family, the children who were the
focus of the allegations, and the Great Neck community.12
Based on information he learned in the movie, Jesse raised
claims in state court and then in a habeas corpus petition in
federal court seeking to vacate the conviction.13 Each legal
challenge was unsuccessful.14 Nevertheless, in a remarkable
opinion, the Second Circuit engaged in a lengthy discussion of
the facts and circumstances in Jesse‟s case, focusing on the
question of actual innocence.15 The court believed that “new
and material evidence”16 in Jesse‟s case established a
“reasonable likelihood”17 that an “injustice”18 may have

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See id. at 156-58.
9. Id. at 160.
10. Id. at 145.
11. CAPTURING THE FRIEDMANS (HBO 2003) [hereinafter CAPTURING
MOVIE].
12. See Friedman v. Rehal, No. 06-CV-3136, 2008 WL 89625 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 4, 2008).
13. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 151.
14. Id. at 151-52.
15. Id. at 152.
16. Id. at 160.
17. Id. at 159.
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occurred. For this reason, it urged the prosecutor to
reinvestigate the case.19 Within days of the decision, the
prosecutor agreed to follow this extraordinary request.
Since the dawn of the DNA testing era, actual innocence
cases have captured the attention of both the legal community
and our society at large. But most cases—like Jesse‟s—do not
present the potential for DNA testing.20 It is certain, however,
that a real percentage of these defendants have been
wrongfully convicted.21 In an era where society has come face to
face with the indisputable reality that there are people in
prison (including people on death row) who are innocent,22 it
should not be acceptable that actually innocent prisoners have
to suffer the punishment of a wrongful conviction simply
because they are not lucky enough to have a case that involved
forensic evidence susceptible to DNA testing.23
In calling for the reinvestigation, the Second Circuit in
Friedman took a novel and creative approach to address the
vexing problems posed by wrongful convictions. More
important, the manner in which the court approached the
question of innocence and called for a reinvestigation

18. Id. at 161.
19. Id. at 160.
20. Brandon Segal, Comment, Habeas Corpus, Equitable Tolling, and
AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations: Why the Schlup v. Delo Gateway Standard
for Claims of Actual Innocence Fails to Alleviate the Plight of Wrongfully
Convicted Americans, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 225, 225 (2008) (“[T]he number of
exonerations of the wrongfully convicted can only be a fraction of the actually
innocent, because most exonerations are DNA-based and many crimes do not
have exonerating DNA evidence.”) (citing Stuart Taylor, Jr., Innocents in
Prison: Many Thousands of Wrongly Convicted People are Rotting in Prisons
and Jails Around the Country, NAT‟L ASS‟N OF CRIM. DEF. LAW. (Aug. 6, 2007),
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/innocence138);
Sarah
A.
Mourer, Gateway to Justice: Constitutional Claims to Actual Innocence, 64 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1279, 1286-87 (2010).
21. Mourer, supra note 20, at 1282-84. See also infra notes 121-24 and
accompanying text.
22. David Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the Future of PostConviction Review, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1027 (citing studies that show 340 postconviction exonerations between 1989 and 2003, with 251 due to DNA
evidence alone).
23. Nicholas Berg, Note, Turning a Blind Eye to Innocence: The Legacy
of Herrera v. Collins, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 143 (2005).
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represents the real innovation in the decision. Despite the fact
that the underlying legal claim was procedurally defective and
substantively meritless, the court took it upon itself to consider
the question of actual innocence. Rather than analyzing the
factual allegations through one of the actual innocence theories
currently in existence, it addressed the question of innocence in
a novel manner and directly linked this analysis to its call for a
reinvestigation of the case. In doing so, the court created a new
mechanism for federal courts to use when they believe that
there may have been an injustice—namely, a call for a
reinvestigation based on “new and material evidence”
establishing a “reasonable likelihood” that a habeas petitioner
is actually innocent.
Part II of this Article will review the Second Circuit‟s
decision in Friedman, explaining the background of the case
and discussing the court‟s opinion. Part III will review the
court‟s analysis in Friedman and show that the court‟s focus on
actual innocence and its call for a reinvestigation were
justified. Part IV will survey the newly developed freestanding
actual innocence claim under the New York State Constitution
and show that the claim, while important, does not render
superfluous the need for courts to call for a reinvestigation in
appropriate cases. Finally, Part V will show why the Second
Circuit‟s analysis on the actual innocence issue was a novel
approach and will breakdown the mechanism that the court
used to provide guidance on how it can be followed in future
cases.
I. Friedman v. Rehal
In 1982, Arnold Friedman, a retired school teacher, began
teaching computer classes to children in the basement of his
family‟s house.24 In 1984, when Jesse was fifteen years old, he
began to assist his father in teaching the classes.25
In 1987, customs agents “intercepted a package containing
24. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 146.
25. Id. Jesse assisted his father up until he left for college in September
1987. Id.
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child pornography addressed to Arnold.”26 Federal agents
searched the Friedman home and discovered additional child
pornography hidden in a desk and behind a piano in the
basement.27 The agents also found a list of eighty-one students
who were enrolled in the computer classes and provided these
names to the Nassau County Police Department.28 The
department‟s Sex Crime Unit “sent out two-detective teams to
interview [the] students.”29
The tactics that the detectives used when interviewing the
students became a central focus of the case. Some former
students and their parents reported that detectives utilized
“aggressive and suggestive questioning techniques to gain
statements from children.”30 Detectives would allegedly reward
children who admitted abuse.31 If a child denied abuse, the
detectives would repeatedly visit the child and conduct lengthy
and overly aggressive follow-up interviews until the child
admitted abuse.32 A secretly videotaped interview with a
former student, Gary Meyers, demonstrated these “hostile”
techniques.33 The videotape showed that, throughout the

26. Id.
27. CAPTURING MOVIE, supra note 11, at 9:49-9:56 & 10:42-10:48.
28. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 146.
29. Id.
30. Id. For example, in an affirmation, one former student reported that
the officers made “specific suggestions [as to what] they believed happened in
the computer classes.” Id. at 147 (quoting Brian Tilker Aff. ¶ 5). The
detectives told him that other students had stated that they had been abused.
Id. The detectives stated that they were certain that he had been abused and
advised him that he should admit it. Id. A detective who had conducted many
of the interviews explained in an interview with the film-makers that, in the
interviews with the children, the detectives would tell them that they knew
“there was a good chance that . . . somebody in that family touched you in a
very inappropriate way.” Id. (quoting transcript of interview with Detective
Squeglia).
31. Id. at 147.
32. Id. at 146-47.
33. Id. at 147. The Friedmans became aware of this videotape during the
criminal case itself and provided it to Jesse‟s lawyer. Id. The attorney
confronted the prosecutor with the videotape and requested that he provide
the defense with any other evidence of these “hostile” techniques. Id. Nothing
was ever turned over. Id.
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interview, the detectives “pressured” Meyers to admit abuse.34
When he persistently maintained that he was not abused, the
detective told Meyers‟ mother that he did not “like his answers”
and referred to Meyers as a “wise guy.”35
As a result of the interviews, Arnold and Jesse were
arrested on a felony complaint alleging child sexual abuse.36
Between December 1987 and December 1988, three separate
indictments were filed charging Jesse with over two hundred
counts of child sexual abuse.37 Despite the great number of
charges, there was no physical evidence of abuse.38 In fact, no
student had ever complained of abuse prior to the
investigation.39 As the case proceeded, however, the allegations
against the Friedmans “grew increasingly bizarre, sadistic, and
even logistically implausible.”40
Due to the nature and extent of the sexual abuse
allegations, “the community [was] in an „uproar.‟”41 The case
received a tremendous amount of media attention in the New

34. Id.
35. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Friedman v. Rehal,
No. 06-CV-3136, interim order at 3 (E.D.N.Y. July 20, 2007).
36. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 146.
37. Id. at 146. In addition, as the case expanded, the prosecution began
to speculate that the Friedmans and other local teenagers had been operating
a “sex ring.” Id. at 148. One of the teenage suspects, Ross Goldstein,
eventually pled guilty pursuant to a cooperation agreement, even though
more than half of the charges were alleged to have taken place before Jesse
and Goldstein had ever met. Id. Goldstein later stated that he had falsely
implicated others. Id.
38. Id. In the movie, the prosecutor, Assistant District Attorney Joe
Onorato, stated that “there was a dearth of physical evidence.” CAPTURING
MOVIE, supra note 11, at 33:43-33:54.
39. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 146.
40. Id. at 147-48. In the movie, an anonymous student described a group
molestation game called “Leap Frog,” in which Jesse would leap frog from one
student to the next inserting his penis into their anuses. CAPTURING MOVIE,
supra note 11, at 29:40-30:29.
41. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 148 (alteration in original) (citing Richard
Tilker Aff. ¶ 10). Hundred of parents attended community meetings to
discuss the allegations. Id. The town defined itself as a “victimized
community,” and those parents and children who denied that the abuse
occurred no longer “fit in.” Id. (citing CAPTURING MOVIE, supra note 11, at
35:26-36:01).
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York newspapers.42 As a result of the “media frenzy” over the
explosive nature of the charges, the judge presiding over the
case, Nassau County Supreme Court Justice Abbey Boklan,
allowed video cameras in the courtroom for the first time in
Nassau County history.43 Notwithstanding the charged
atmosphere, the judge denied Jesse‟s request for a change of
venue.44
On March 25, 1988, Arnold Friedman pled guilty to fortytwo counts of child sexual abuse and was sentenced to an
aggregate sentence of ten to thirty years in prison.45 He pled
guilty “at least in part because he believed [Jesse] would have a
better chance at a fair trial that way.”46
After his father‟s guilty plea, Jesse, now nineteen years
old, claimed to have felt “enormous pressure” to plead guilty.47
According to Jesse‟s attorney, Justice Boklan expressly
informed Jesse‟s attorney that, if Jesse was convicted after
trial, she intended to impose consecutive sentences.48 In
response to the threat and out of a fear that he might spend
most of his life in prison, Jesse advised his attorney that he
42. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 148.
43. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. Id. at 149.
45. Id.; Friedman v. Rehal, No. 06-CV-3136, interim order at 4 (E.D.N.Y.
July 20, 2007). Arnold Friedman also pled guilty in federal court to sending
child pornography through the mail. Leonard Buder, A Pornographer Given
10 Years By a U.S. Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1988. He was sentenced to 10
years in prison. Id. It was also discussed in the documentary that Arnold
admitted that, when he was in his early forties, he had sexual contact with
two young boys while at his summer home. CAPTURING MOVIE, supra note 11,
at 1:11:20-1:13:50.
46. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 149. In the documentary, Arnold stated in a
home movie filmed right before the plea that this was one of his reasons for
pleading guilty. CAPTURING MOVIE, supra note 11, at 1:11:04-1:11:10; see also
id. at 1:00:47-1:01:14 & 1:02:14-1:02:18. After the guilty plea, however,
Arnold was pressured to admit to the police that he had abused eighty
children. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 149. Soon afterwards, Newsday leaked
Arnold‟s admissions. Id.; see also Alvin E. Bessent, Teen Faces 37 New Sex
Charges, NEWSDAY, June 24, 1988.
47. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 149.
48. Id. The judge made this threat apparently before she had seen any of
the evidence against Jesse. Id. In the movie, Justice Boklan stated that
“[t]here was never a doubt in [her] mind” as to Jesse‟s guilt. Id. (citing
CAPTURING MOVIE, supra note 11, at 31:28-31:32).
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wished to plead guilty.49
On December 20, 1988, Jesse pled guilty to seventeen
counts of sodomy in the first degree, four counts of sexual
abuse in the first degree, and other lesser counts.50 On January
24, 1989, Jesse was sentenced to an aggregate term of six to
eighteen years in prison.51
In 1990, Arnold and Jesse both signed an “Open Letter,”
that challenged the tactics that the police used to obtain
admissions from the children.52 Throughout the letter, they
alleged that detectives “grilled, coerced, pressured, lied to, and
victimized children to encourage them to falsely accuse” the
Friedmans of wrongdoing.53
After spending thirteen years in prison, Jesse was released
on parole in December 2001.54 In 2000, “documentary
filmmaker Andrew Jarecki began investigating the Friedman
case for a possible film. Jarecki interviewed members of the
Friedman family, many of the former . . . students” and their

49. Id. at 150 (quoting Panaro Aff. ¶ 12). The Second Circuit criticized
Jesse‟s attorney for requiring Jesse to admit his guilt directly to the attorney
before he would allow him to plead guilty. See id. In a footnote, the court
stated that the attorney‟s actions could not be reconciled with both the
federal and New York State Constitutions, which allow a defendant to plead
guilty without explicitly admitting his guilt so long as the plea itself is
knowing and voluntary. Id. at 150 n.1 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970) and People v. Serrano, 206 N.E.2d 330, 333 (N.Y.
1965)).
50. Id. at 150. Both the district court and the Second Circuit refer to
December 20th—the date of the guilty plea—as the judgment date. Id. at 151;
Friedman, No. 06-CV-3136, interim order at 5. However, under New York
law, the judgment date is the sentencing date, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
1.20(15) (McKinney 2003), here, January 24, 1989. Friedman, No. 06-CV3136, interim order at 7.
51. Alvin E. Bessent, Teen Gets 6-18 Years for Child Sex Abuse,
NEWSDAY, Jan. 25, 1989, at 35. At sentencing, both Jesse and his attorney
claimed that Arnold sexually abused him as a child. Id. Soon after the guilty
plea, Jesse gave a televised interview with Geraldo Rivera in which he
repeated his admission of guilt and reiterated that his father had abused
him. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 150.
52. Friedman, No. 06-CV-3136, interim order at 4-5.
53. Id. at 5.
54. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 151. Upon his release, Jesse was classified a
level III “violent sexual predator” under the Sex Offender Registration Act.
Id.
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parents, law enforcement personnel, the judge, and attorneys
involved in the case.55 “After a three-year investigation, Jarecki
created Capturing the Friedmans . . . .”56 In the movie, an
anonymous student, who was referred to in one of the
indictments as “Gregory Doe,” claimed that he was subject to
hypnosis prior to recalling abuse.57 Jesse viewed the film for
the first time on January 10, 2003.58
On January 7, 2004, Jesse moved to vacate the judgment
of conviction under New York Criminal Procedure Law §
440.10(h).59 Jesse claimed that the movie brought to light three
new pieces of evidence: (1) some eyewitnesses initially denied
that petitioner sexually abused them; (2) “detectives used
interrogation methods known for eliciting false accusations”;
and (3) the hypnosis of at least one accuser before he made any
accusations.60 Jesse “argued that, pursuant to Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), he was entitled to the disclosure
of [this exonerating material] prior to the entry of his guilty
plea.”61 Jesse did not raise an actual innocence claim. The
Nassau County Court denied the motion62 and, on March 10,
55. Friedman v. Rehal, No. 06-CV-3136, 2008 WL 89625, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 4, 2008) (citations omitted).
56. Id. One of the more compelling aspects of the film was the large
number of home movies that the Friedman family provided to the film
makers. These home movies provided a behind-the-scenes look at how the
family members (which included Jesse‟s mom and two older brothers)
struggled with the allegations and the criminal prosecution.
57. Id. at 151; CAPTURING MOVIE, supra note 11, at 1:20:11-1:21:00. Both
the student‟s therapist, as well as the prosecutor, denied that any hypnosis
was ever used. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 151. For his part, Jesse claimed that
other evidence showed that hypnosis was used more broadly. Id.
58. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 151. Jarecki allowed Jesse to view the
underlying investigatory materials in July 2003. Id. The movie itself was
released in theaters on May 30, 2003. Carol Strickland, A Family in Great
Neck, and the Secret Life it Led, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2003.
59. Friedman, 2008 WL 89625, at *2. This section provides, in relevant
part: “At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it was
entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment upon the
ground that . . . (h) [t]he judgment was obtained in violation of a right of the
defendant under the constitution of this state or of the United States.” N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(h) (McKinney 2011).
60. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 151.
61. Id.
62. Id. The state court denied the claim on the merits, relying on United
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2006, the New York Appellate Division denied Jesse‟s
application for leave to appeal.63
On June 23, 2006, Jesse filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.64 He asserted that his due process rights were violated
based on the prosecution‟s failure to disclose the three
categories of newly discovered evidence.65 On July 20, 2007, the
district court concluded that the claims based on the first two
types of evidence—the initial denials and the police
interrogation techniques—were untimely under the one-year
statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).66 On January 4, 2008, the district court
held that the third claim based on the hypnosis was also
untimely.67 However, the district court granted Jesse a
certificate of appealability.68
In an opinion written by District Judge Edward R.
Korman, sitting by designation, the Second Circuit affirmed.69
States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), which held that the Brady rule does not
apply to impeachment evidence in guilty plea context. Id.
63. Id. Jesse also sought leave to appeal from the New York Court of
Appeals, which was denied. Id. at 152 n.3. However, as the Second Circuit
noted, Jesse had exhausted his remedies after leave was denied from the
Appellate Division. Id. at 151.
64. Id.; Friedman, 2008 WL 89625, at *1.
65. Friedman v. Rehal, No. 06-CV-3136, interim order at 5-6 (E.D.N.Y.
July 20, 2007).
66. Id. at 2. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA), a petitioner has one year from the date his conviction becomes final
to file a petition for habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2006). The statute does
provide some exceptions, however, including situations where petitioner
could not have previously learned the factual basis of the claim through the
exercise of due diligence. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(D). The district court concluded that
Jesse was on notice of this type of evidence before the movie, as reflected in
his lawyer‟s knowledge of the Meyer‟s videotape and the information
contained in the Open Letter. Friedman, No. 06-CV-3136, interim order at
10-11.
67. Friedman, 2008 WL 89625, at *2-6. The court concluded that
petitioner did not file his petition within one year of January 3, 2003, the
date when he learned the factual basis for the claim. Id. at *7.
68. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 152. In a habeas proceeding, a petitioner can
only bring an appeal from a denial if either the district court or the circuit
court grants a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253. To obtain
one, a petitioner must show a “substantial denial of a constitutional right.”
Id.
69. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 145, 161.
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The court opened its opinion with a “lengthy discussion of the
facts and circumstances”70 of the case, relying upon “the facts
as alleged in the petition, as well as the affidavits and
supporting materials, including the transcript used in . . .
Capturing the Friedmans, and the memoranda of interviews
taken in preparation for the film.”71 This discussion covered the
facts as set forth above, but went one step further. In several
instances, the court presented Jesse‟s allegations of police,
prosecutorial, and judicial misconduct as accepted fact. For
instance, the court flatly stated that, “[d]etectives generally
entered an interview with a presumption that a child had been
abused and refused to accept denials of abuse.”72 Similarly, the
court stated, as true, that Justice Boklan had threatened
consecutive sentences if Jesse went to trial and was convicted.73
The court, however, provided no record citation for this factual
assertion. Rather, it seems to have been a fact that Jesse‟s trial
attorney alleged in his affirmation.74 The factual recitation
served its intended purpose: it cannot be denied after reading

70. Id. at 161 (internal quotations omitted).
71. Id. at 145. In the end, the court limited the “new and material
evidence” to the “post-conviction consensus within the social science
community that [the] suggestive” techniques used here can induce false
allegations. Id. at 160 (internal quotations omitted).
72. Id. at 146.
73. Id. at 149. In general, a guilty plea is rendered involuntary if a judge
threatens the defendant that she will impose a far more severe sentence
should the defendant reject the plea offer and proceed to trial. People v.
Wilson, 666 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165-66 (App. Div. 1997) (guilty plea coerced where
judge promised to impose sentence almost four times greater than the plea
offer); People v. Beverly, 528 N.Y.S.2d 450, 450 (App. Div. 1988) (guilty plea
coerced where, prior to plea, court told defendant that if he went to trial,
court probably would sentence him to “the maximum sentence, „on top of‟ the
sentence for another crime”); People v. Christian, 527 N.Y.S.2d 1020, 1020
(App. Div. 1988) (“A defendant may not be induced to plead guilty by the
threat of a heavier sentence if he decides to proceed to trial . . . .”); People v.
Griffith, 435 N.Y.S.2d 767, 768 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1981) (guilty plea coerced
by the trial court's “explicit threat of a heavier sentence should he choose to
proceed to trial”).
74. In the paragraph after the court discussed the threat, it focused on
the impact of the threat. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 150. At that point, the court
cited to trial counsel‟s affirmation. Id. Since there is no specific record
citation for the threat, it is fair to deduce that the threat itself, supposedly
made to trial counsel, was alleged in the same affirmation.
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the compelling presentation that the Friedman case had every
mark of a criminal investigation gone wrong.
After setting forth the background of the case (without a
specific focus on the actual legal claim raised), the court turned
to the Brady claim.75 On appeal, Jesse only advanced the Brady
claim relating to the evidence of hypnosis.76 As did the district
court, the Second Circuit concluded that this claim was
untimely because Jesse did not file his petition within one year
of the date that he learned the factual predicate for the claim,
namely when he first watched the movie.77
After finding the petition untimely, the court first
introduced the notion of “actual innocence” into the case.78 It
noted that “[a] claim of actual innocence could provide a basis
for excusing this late filing even though petitioner pled
guilty.”79 The court decided, however, not to “resolve” this issue
because it concluded that the underlying Brady claim had no
merit.80
The court did not end its opinion there. After it concluded
that the claim was both procedurally defective and
substantively meritless, the court took an extraordinary turn
and “voic[ed] some concern regarding the process by which the
petitioner‟s conviction was obtained.”81 The court then engaged
in a lengthy analysis of what it viewed as serious problems
with the evidence in Jesse‟s case.82 The court detailed the
“[v]ast moral panic” surrounding large-scale child abuse
allegations that engulfed the country in the late-1980s and

75. Id. at 151.
76. Id. at 152.
77. Id. The court found that, once the time was tolled for the periods in
which Jesse first sought relief in state court, the petition was filed three
months late. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 161 (2d Cir. 2004)).
80. Id. The court concluded that Ruiz barred relief, and, to the extent
that the hypnosis could potentially be considered “exculpatory” Brady
material, there was no clearly established Supreme Court precedent
providing that Brady material must be turned over prior to a guilty plea. Id.
at 153-55.
81. Id. at 155.
82. Id. at 155-62.
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early-1990s.83 After discussing the many problems surrounding
the interviewing techniques used to obtain evidence of abuse in
these large-scale abuse cases,84 the court stated that, “viewed
in its proper historical context, petitioner‟s case appears as
merely one example of what was then a significant national
trend.”85 It was a “heater case” where “the criminal process
often fails.”86 The police appeared “unfazed by the lack of
physical evidence” and “the prosecution allowed itself to get
swept up in” the moral panic.87
The court stated that Jesse had “come forward with
substantial evidence that flawed interviewing techniques were
used” to obtain a massive amount of allegations.88 Jesse “never
had an opportunity to explore how the evidence against him
was obtained.”89 To the contrary, all parties involved in the
case put pressure on him to plead guilty and, based on the
moral panic and the judge‟s admitted feelings on the case, the
chances of a fair trial were slim.90 In contrast to cases where
the court can “take comfort” in a verdict after trial, the
“extraordinarily suspect” evidence in the case was “never
subjected to vigorous cross-examination” or judged by a
“properly instructed jury.”91 In this way, the court described
Jesse‟s case as “unlike other appeals which raise concerns
about the quality of the evidence and the guilt of the
defendant.”92
The court then focused on how a habeas court should

83. Id. at 155.
84. Id. at 156-57.
85. Id. at 157-58.
86. Id. at 158 (quoting Susan Bandes, The Lessons of Capturing the
Friedmans: Moral Panic, Institutional Denial and Due Process, 3 J.L.
CULTURE
&
HUMAN.
293,
310
(2007),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=781585)
(internal
quotation marks omitted).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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proceed when faced with a claim of actual innocence.93 In
framing its analysis, the court quoted from a seminal article by
former Second Circuit Judge Henry Friendly, who opined that,
in an “unusual case of the innocent man,” a habeas court
should be more concerned about exercising its equitable power
rather than feel “burdened by so much dross in the process.”94
Nevertheless, the court noted that whether or not a freestanding actual innocence claim under the federal Constitution
“exists [remains] an open question” in the Supreme Court.95
While the Court has assumed arguendo at times that such a
claim may exist, it has “not[ed] the difficult questions such a
right would pose and the high standard any claimant would
have to meet.”96
The Second Circuit stated that, even if it assumed that
such a right existed and that Jesse could meet the high
standard, the court could not reach the issue since the actual
innocence claim was unexhausted.97 The court noted that Jesse
may still have a remedy in state court as some New York State
courts have concluded that an actual innocence claim may rely
on the New York State Constitution.98 The court believed that

93. See id. at 159.
94. Id. (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral
Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 148 (1970)). The full
quotation contained in Friedman is:
A remedy that produces no result in the overwhelming
majority of cases, . . . an unjust one to the state in much of
the exceedingly small minority, and a truly good one only
rarely, would seem to need consideration with a view to
caring for the unusual case of the innocent man without
being burdened by so much dross in the process.
Id. (quoting Friendly, supra) (alteration omitted).
95. Id. (citing Dist. Attorney‟s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne,
129 S. Ct. 2308, 2321 (2009)).
96. Id. (quoting Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2321) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
97. Id. “An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
unless it appears that: the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in
the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2006).
98. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 159 (citing cases). See infra notes 222-53 and
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Jesse‟s case “may be one in which the New York courts may be
particularly sympathetic . . . .”99
Despite the legal impediment to relief, the court believed
that it still had options to right the injustice. The court pointed
to the district attorney‟s “continuing ethical obligation . . . to
seek justice.”100 Relying upon a comment in the New York
Rules of Professional Conduct, the court stated that
prosecutors are required “to take reasonable remedial
measures when it appears likely that an innocent person was
wrongly convicted.”101 The comment provides further: “[W]hen
a prosecutor comes to know of new and material evidence
creating a reasonable likelihood that a person was wrongly
convicted, the prosecutor should examine the evidence and
undertake such further inquiry or investigation as may be
necessary to determine whether the conviction was
wrongful.”102
The court stated that, under that standard, Jesse had
provided “new and material evidence” that suggested a
“reasonable likelihood” that he was wrongly convicted.103 The
court emphasized that “[o]nly a reinvestigation of the
underlying case or the development of a complete record in a
collateral proceeding can provide a basis for determining
whether petitioner‟s conviction should be set aside.”104 The
court “hope[d]” that, even if the “current Nassau County
District Attorney, who was not responsible for the investigation
and prosecution of Jesse Friedman,” continued to oppose
collateral relief, she would “undertake the kind of complete
review of the underlying case” required under the ethical
rules.105
Remarkably, only three days after the opinion was issued,

accompanying text.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 6B (2009))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 159-60.
104. Id. at 160.
105. Id.
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Nassau County District Attorney Kathleen Rice agreed to
reinvestigate the case.106 Ronald Kuby, one of Jesse‟s lawyers,
summed up the decision best when he stated:
I‟ve never seen the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit criticize a district attorney‟s
office
and
police
practices
with
such
vehemence—nor have I ever seen them so vocally
advocate for a reexamination of a case, . . . . I‟ve
lost a lot of cases in the Second Circuit, but I‟ve
never lost one this well.107
II. The Second Circuit Was Justified In Using Its Equitable
Powers to Call for a Reinvestigation of the Case Out of Its
Concern that Jesse May Be Actually Innocent
While truly remarkable, the Second Circuit‟s opinion in
Friedman does raise some questions. The court engaged in a
detailed analysis of the actual innocence claim even though it
had concluded that the petition was procedurally defective, the
underlying claim was meritless, and there was a legal bar to
the court granting relief to the petitioner. Under such
circumstances, it must be asked whether it was appropriate for
the court to even consider the actual innocence claim.
The appropriateness of the court‟s actions was not absent
from the opinion itself. In fact, this question was expressly
raised in the concurring opinion of Judge Rena Raggi.108 In her
brief concurrence, Judge Raggi questioned whether the court
106. See Andrew Keshner, Rice Picks Advisers for Review of Friedman
Child Sex Abuse Case, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 9, 2010, at 1. At the time of the
announcement, Rice was running for New York State Attorney General.
Mark Hamblett, Court Faults Abuse Prosecution but Rejects Petition for
Habeas, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 17, 2010, at 1. Any concern, however, that her
announcement was political was alleviated in November 2010 when she
appointed a diverse advisory panel of experts that included Barry Scheck of
the Innocence Project, Susan Herman, a criminal justice professor at Pace
University, and Mark Pomerantz, a well-known New York trial attorney.
Keshner, supra.
107. Hamblett, supra note 106.
108. Id. at 161 (Raggi, J., concurring).
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should have engaged in its “lengthy discussion of the facts and
circumstances that Friedman asserts led to his conviction,
much less assume the truth of those facts or the misconduct of
police officers, prosecutors, defense counsel, and the presiding
state court judge before a hearing.”109 Nonetheless, Judge
Raggi did agree that “the facts alleged are disturbing and may
well warrant further inquiry by a responsible prosecutor‟s
office.”110
The court responded to her concerns in the main opinion.
After pointing out that all three panel members did agree that
a reinvestigation was warranted, the court stated that it would
prefer for the facts to be developed at a hearing.111 It lamented,
however, that it simply did not have the power to order it over
the objection of the district attorney, who refused to waive the
defense of statute of limitations.112
Nevertheless, the court emphasized that its purpose in
engaging in the lengthy discussion of actual innocence was “to
make the case that a „further inquiry by a responsible
prosecutor‟s office‟ is justified despite a guilty plea entered
under circumstances which clearly suggest that it was not
voluntary.”113 It concluded, “an appellate court faced with a
record that raises serious issues as to the guilt of the defendant
and the means by which his conviction was procured, yet
unable to grant relief, is not obligated to become a silent
accomplice to what may be an injustice.”114
Thus, the court viewed the purposes of its discussion as
two-fold: to make the case for a reinvestigation and to voice its
concern about a possible injustice. But it was not any type of
injustice. It is clear from the decision that the injustice here
was the potential actual innocence of Jesse Friedman.
Although the manner in which it proceeded was
unorthodox, the court‟s focus on whether there had been an

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 160-61.
Id. at 161.
Id.
Id.
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injustice was justified based on the central role that actual
innocence plays in habeas law. Further, the call for a
reinvestigation was a creative and prudent step forward for
actual innocence cases.
A. The Call for a Reinvestigation Carefully Balanced the
Equitable Principles Present in Habeas Jurisprudence
The history of the writ of habeas corpus has been
“inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental
rights of personal liberty. . . . [I]ts function has been to provide
a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to
be intolerable restraints.”115 “[H]abeas corpus is, at its core, an
equitable remedy.”116 Over the years, habeas courts “acquired
„enormous flexibility and power.‟”117 In this regard, the habeas
corpus statutes provide that a court entertaining an application
for a writ of habeas corpus shall “dispose of the matter as law
and justice require.”118
At this point, there can be no doubt that actually innocent
people are suffering intolerable restraints. “Legal and scientific
studies clearly establish that the conviction and execution of
innocent Americans does occur.”119 Since the dawn of the DNA
era in the late 1980s, over 250 people have been exonerated of

115. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963).
116. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319 (1995).
117. Segal, supra note 20, at 230 (quoting Max Rosenn, The Great Writ:
A Reflection of Societal Change, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 353 (1983)).
118. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006).
119. Segal, supra note 20, at 225 (citing a “conservative study” that
estimated almost 10,000 innocent citizens are convicted each year); Jake
Sussman, Unlimited Innocence: Recognizing an “Actual Innocence” Exception
to AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 343, 377
& n.154 (2001-2002) (listing articles detailing numerous wrongful
convictions). See also Mourer, supra note 20, at 1283-84; Berg, supra note 23,
at 121 (“We now know that we convict innocent people of crimes, including
murder, and we know that we sometimes sentence innocent people to death.
The American public now believes that we execute innocent people, and the
unease about the specter of this happening has reached the chambers of the
Supreme Court . . . .”) (quoting Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82
N.C. L. REV. 61, 63 (2003)).
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serious crimes due to new and material evidence.120 “We now
know, in a way almost unthinkable even a decade ago, that our
system of criminal justice, for all its protections, is sufficiently
fallible that innocent people are convicted of capital crimes
with some frequency.”121 It cannot be denied that “depriving
the innocent of life and liberty completely undermines the
public‟s confidence in our criminal justice system.”122
And the federal courts have a critical role in ensuring
protection of the innocent. “[N]ot only should the innocent
defendant not be incarcerated or executed—that is patently
obvious—but it is a responsibility of the federal courts to see
that this does not occur.”123 One district court judge in New
York has stated that “[i]f there is any core function of habeas
corpus—any constitutionally required minimum below which
the scope of federal habeas may not be reduced—it would be to
free the innocent person unconstitutionally incarcerated.”124
“The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered
with the initiative and flexibility essential to ensure that
miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and
corrected.”125
Thus, federal courts in habeas cases should exercise their
broad equitable powers in such a way as to ensure that
innocent persons do not suffer unjust punishment. The call for
reinvestigation is just such an equitable response. Notably,
even in her concurrence, Judge Raggi did not object to a call to
120. David Wolitz, supra note 22, at 1028.
121. United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416, 420 (S.D.N.Y.
2002), rev’d, 313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002).
122. Segal, supra note 20, at 236 (citing Limin Zheng, Comment, Actual
Innocence as a Gateway Through the Statute of Limitations Bar on the Filing
of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 2101, 2136 (2002)).
123. Sussman, supra note 119, at 367-68 (quoting Bruce Ledewitz,
Habeas Corpus as a Safety Valve for Innocence, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 415, 430 (1990-1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Alexander v. Keane, 991 F. Supp. 329, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). See also
Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 248, 323 (1988)
(“Although the concept of „actual innocence‟ has not explicitly played a part in
federal post-conviction jurisprudence until recently, it is obvious that an
enlightened system of justice should not tolerate continued incarceration of
one who is demonstrably innocent.”).
125. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969).
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reinvestigate the case.126
The call for a reinvestigation appropriately balances the
equitable concerns present in habeas law—fairness, finality,
and federalism.127 The utility of a reinvestigation in certain
cases cannot be denied, as recent history has shown that
reinvestigations have led to numerous exonerations.128
Fairness dictates that all legitimate post-conviction claims to
innocence should be fully investigated to determine whether
there has been an injustice. And, in our criminal justice
system, the prosecution plays a vital role in ensuring that such
an injustice does not occur. As the New York Court of Appeals
has stated, “[p]rosecutors occupy a dual role as advocates and
as public officers and, as such, they are charged with the duty
not only to seek convictions but also to see that justice is
done.”129 As the Second Circuit pointed out in Friedman, that
126. Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 161-62 (Raggi, J., concurring).
127. Daniel M. Bradley, Jr., Schlup v. Delo: The Burden of Showing
Actual Innocence in Habeas Corpus Review and Congress’ Effort at Reform,
23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 463, 483 (1997) (“Fairness,
finality, and federalism are considered the touchstone principles that guide
and shape habeas jurisprudence.”); see also Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S.
930, 945 (2007) (internal citations omitted) (stating that the goals of the
AEDPA were to “further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism”
(quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003))); Eric Seinsheimer,
Supreme Court Review: Dretke v. Haley and the Still Unknown Limits of the
Actual Innocence Exception, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 905, 907 (2005)
(“[I]t is the precarious balance between a prisoner‟s right to freedom from
unlawful confinement and a state‟s interest in comity and finality that
continues to avoid simple resolution today.” (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 368 (6th ed. 2002))).
128. For example, the well-known Medill Innocence Project at
Northwestern University, under the direction of Professor David Protess, has
been able to uncover evidence through post-conviction investigation to free
eleven innocent men. MEDILL INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.medillinnocenc
eproject.org/home (last visited Feb. 1, 2011); see also Monica Davey,
Prosecutors Turn Tables on Student Journalists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2009, at
A14. The Medill Innocence Project is now part of The Innocence Network, a
consortium of more than fifty similar projects at journalism and law schools.
See THE INNOCENCE NETWORK, http://www.innocencenetwork.org/members.ht
ml (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). In 2009 alone, the network‟s investigations led
to twenty-seven exonerations. Innocence Network Exonerations 2009, THE
INNOCENCE NETWORK, http://www.innocencenetwork.org/report09.html (last
visited Feb. 2, 2011).
129. People v. Steadman, 623 N.E.2d 509, 511 (N.Y. 1993); see also
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obligation to seek justice clearly continues after a conviction.130
The court pointed out that the New York Rules of Professional
Conduct for prosecutors do require the prosecutor to act, postconviction, when it appears that an injustice has occurred.131
In fact, the Supreme Court has also discussed a
prosecutor‟s duty to correct wrongful convictions. In Imbler v.
Pachtman,132 the Court explained that one of the justifications
for granting absolute immunity to prosecutors lies in the fact
that they have a continuing duty to correct injustices.
Specifically, the Court stated:
The possibility of personal liability also could
dampen the prosecutor‟s exercise of his duty to
bring to the attention of the court or of proper
officials all significant evidence suggestive of
innocence or mitigation. At trial this duty is
enforced by the requirements of due process, but
after a conviction the prosecutor also is bound by
the ethics of his office to inform the appropriate
authority of after-acquired or other information
that casts doubt upon the correctness of the
conviction.133
As can be seen, even the Supreme Court sees the obligation to
reinvestigate legitimate claims of actual innocence as a
continuing and fundamental aspect of a prosecutor‟s duty to
seek justice.
The call for a reinvestigation also does not undermine a
state‟s interest in finality. “Habeas corpus law is one of the

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“[The prosecution‟s interest]
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, [the
prosecutor] is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.”); see
also N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (“A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”).
130. Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 159 (2d Cir. 2010).
131. Id. at 159 (citing N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 6B).
132. 424 U.S. 409, 427 n.25 (1976).
133. Id. (emphasis added).
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most contentious areas of law because it is the only instance in
which federal courts can review and overturn state court
decisions without giving res judicata effect to those
decisions.”134 One of the main counterbalancing forces to that
power is the state‟s strong interest in the finality of a criminal
conviction.135 The call in Friedman does not run counter to that
interest. It is a moderate approach that respects the finality of
the conviction—the conviction remains in place—but creates
the possibility that a miscarriage of justice will be corrected.
Notably, there is no guarantee that the investigation will have
any effect on the finality of the conviction. As Judge Raggi
stated in her concurrence, no one can “predict whether the
outcome of any such inquiry will be favorable to petitioner.”136
The call for reinvestigation simply provides a mechanism for
further review that could lead to a more accurate conclusion.
But no matter the outcome, there will be clear societal
benefits. If the prosecution investigates the case and concludes
that there was an injustice, then society can be assured that,
when the conviction is vacated, even the prosecution believes
that justice is being served. On the other hand, if the
reinvestigation leads to evidence that shows that the conviction
is reliable, then public confidence in the criminal justice system
will be replenished.137
In a similar vein, the call for a reinvestigation is fully
consistent with the notions of comity and federalism. It is a
hands-off approach that affirms state sovereignty138 as it
provides a state agency with full discretion to determine the
extent of the investigation and whether, after further

134. Andre Mathis, A Critical Analysis of Actual Innocence After House
v. Bell: Has the Riddle of Actual Innocence Finally Been Solved?, 37 U. MEM.
L. REV. 813, 815 (2007) (citing MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY,
FEDERAL COURTS 623 (5th ed. 2002)).
135. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730, 739 (1991).
136. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 161 (Raggi, J., concurring).
137. See Bradley, supra note 127, at 485-86 (“It is not in society‟s
interest, however, to punish those who are completely innocent of a crime.”).
138. Arleen Anderson, Responding to the Challenges of Actual Innocence
Claims After Herrera v. Collins, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 489, 499 (1998) (“Other
commentators maintain that the concept of state sovereignty is affirmed by
the states themselves adjudicating claims of actual innocence.”).
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investigation, the conviction should be upset.139
In further support of the court‟s actions, the call for an
investigation is completely in line with current trends in the
criminal justice system. As concerns for the wrongfully
convicted have grown, many states and local district attorney‟s
offices have taken steps to address these concerns.140 One of the
more significant developments has been the establishment of
post-conviction investigatory units. For example, through
statute, North Carolina established the North Carolina
Innocence Inquiry Commission, a state agency established to
“investigate and evaluate post-conviction claims of factual
innocence.”141 Further, an “emerging trend” is for district
attorney‟s offices, including the New York County District

139. N.Y. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 6D (2009).
If the prosecutor comes to know of clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant was convicted of an offense that
the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor should seek to
remedy the injustice by taking appropriate steps to remedy
the wrongful conviction. These steps may include,
depending on the particular circumstances, disclosure of the
evidence to the defendant, requesting that the court appoint
counsel for an unrepresented indigent defendant and, where
appropriate, notifying the court that the prosecutor believes
that the defendant was wrongfully convicted.
Id.; see, e.g., People v. Calabria, 816 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (N.Y. 2004)
(Rosenblatt, J., concurring) (“If on further investigation the District Attorney
shares these concerns, he has the power and, I am confident, the motivation,
to take whatever steps are appropriate to do justice.”).
140. Wolitz, supra note 22, at 1031-32 (discussing the different methods
states have developed to address wrongful convictions, such as DNA testing
statutes and commissions to study systemic problems leading to wrongful
convictions).
141. N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMMISSION, http://www.innocencecommis
sion-nc.gov/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2011). See also Larry May & Nancy Viner,
Actual Innocence and Manifest Injustice, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 481, 482, 496
(2005) (recommending creation of special appellate court or permanent
special master to consider evidence of actual innocence). Canada and
England have also set up post-conviction innocence commissions. Bruce A.
Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction
Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 490-92 (2009) (discussing
England‟s Criminal Cases Review Commission and Canada‟s Criminal
Conviction Review Group).
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Attorney‟s Office, to set up wrongful conviction units to
potentially reinvestigate wrongful convictions.142
As Barry Scheck has stated, the development of these
conviction integrity units within district attorney‟s offices
“represents an extremely significant first step toward achieving
serious quality assurance in the criminal justice system.”143
Prosecutors have greater access to resources that simply are
not readily available to other entities,144 in particular pro se

142. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., A Conviction Integrity Initiative, 73 ALB. L.
REV. 1213 (2010) (announcing the establishment of New York County District
Attorney‟s Office Conviction Integrity Unit); John Eligon, Prosecutor in
Manhattan Will Monitor Convictions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2010, at A20. It
also appears that the Kings County District Attorney‟s Office has such a unit.
See People v. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d 477, 483 (Sup. Ct. 2003). One of the more
effective units has been the one established in Dallas County, which has
played a role in over twenty exonerations, including two non-DNA cases.
Barry Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why We Need
Them, Why They Will Work, and Models for Creating Them, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2215, 2250 n.99 (2010). Another notable unit is the Post Conviction
Review Section assembled in 2009 by the Harris, Texas County District
Attorney to investigate credible claims of innocence. James McKinley,
Cleared, and Pondering the Value of 27 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, at
A12. As of July 2010, that unit had cleared two wrongfully convicted men,
Michael Anthony Green and Allen Wayne Porter. Peggy O‟Hare, Odds Still
Against Clearing Convicts, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 2, 2010, at A1.
143. Scheck, supra note 142, at 2256.
144. For example, in a footnote in his Conviction Integrity article, Scheck
discusses the exoneration of Steven Phillips. Id. at 2250 n.101. After the
exoneration, the police investigator of the prosecution‟s conviction integrity
unit pursued a lead with police departments in other states until the
investigator was able to identify the perpetrator of the crimes to which
Phillips had originally pled guilty. Id. Similarly, in arguing why it was
important for prosecutors to reinvestigate post-conviction innocence claims,
Bruce Green and Ellen Yaroshefsky state that, “it will be difficult without the
prosecutor‟s assistance to prove the defendant‟s innocence, because the
defense will rarely have access to evidence comparable to that of the
prosecution.” Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 141, at 502 (2009). They use
the infamous case of the two defendants who were convicted, but later
exonerated, of the murder of a bouncer outside the Palladium nightclub as an
example. Id. at 502-03.
The prosecution had access to imprisoned witnesses and
other witnesses who were far more likely to speak with law
enforcement authorities than with defense counsel.
Evidently, the prosecutor‟s familiarity with some of the
exculpatory evidence from having personally conducted
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prisoners.145 They have the ability to review their own files,
which contains the full investigatory material gathered in
every case. Prosecutors will also have better access to police
departments and whatever materials they may have available
in a case. Further, they will have experienced investigators on
staff who can be dispatched quickly and efficiently to
investigate any credible claim of innocence. In addition, as
more and more district attorney‟s offices develop the postconviction units and take on more cases, the prosecutors and
investigators will gain an expertise in pursuing the validity of
these claims.146
On the other hand, the existence of these units does not
provide a full guarantee that credible claims will be
investigated. There are strong “psychological reasons why
prosecutors might be unduly skeptical of post-conviction
challenges.”147 Even with the existence of the unit, there

aspects of the investigation was superior to that of defense
counsel.
Id.
145. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 141, at 508-09 (“Prosecutors must
assume this responsibility because convicted defendants generally lack the
resources to uncover new evidence or to follow up effectively on their own.”);
Segal, supra note 20, at 248 (“It would appear very difficult for pro se
prisoners, while incarcerated, to satisfactorily perform witness investigations,
secure post-conviction DNA testing, or analyze physical evidence.”); Zheng,
supra note 122, at 2135 (“It is convenient to blame prisoners for inactivity,
but prisoners generally lack the resources necessary to conduct a thorough
investigation of the new evidence by themselves.”).
146. See Wolitz, supra note 22, at 1033, 1075.
147. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 141, at 472, 487-88. Discussing
“cognitive bias” that can affect a prosecutor in the post-conviction setting, the
authors state:
There is a significant body of social science literature about
how human judgment is skewed by psychological biases,
such as “confirmation bias” and “hindsight bias.” Cognitive
biases account for what is popularly known as ”tunnel
vision,” the human tendency to evaluate evidence through
the lens of one‟s preexisting expectations and conclusions.
Id.

25

652

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:2

certainly can be “a natural unwillingness”148 for a district
attorney‟s office to reopen a conviction that its own office
obtained—either by jury verdict or guilty plea—particularly
where they believe that the proper procedures were followed.149
Indeed, in a high profile case such as Friedman, it would seem
unlikely for the prosecution to second-guess how it handled the
case where each step in the process was so carefully watched
by the media and the public.150 When a prosecutor publicly
questions the reliability of the conviction in such a case, there
is a fear that the public‟s confidence in the district attorney‟s
office will be undermined.151 There certainly is a potential that

148. People v. Calabria, 816 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (N.Y. 2004) (Rosenblatt,
J., concurring).
149. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 141, at 475, 487-89.
150. Green and Yaroshefsky point out that, in the Palladium case, see
supra note 144, allegations were made that a prosecutor‟s “political selfinterest” may have motivated his actions in the post-conviction proceedings.
Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 141, at 467-70. In that case, a senior
prosecutor in the New York County District Attorney‟s Office was assigned to
reinvestigate after the defense came forward with new exonerating evidence.
Id. at 467-68. After investigating the evidence, the prosecutor became
convinced of the defendants‟ innocence and chose not to challenge their postconviction motion for relief from the judgment. Id. at 468. This decision,
however, was overruled by more senior prosecutors. Id.
[A] New York Times article raised questions about how the
district attorney made the decision to reject the senior
prosecutor‟s recommendation to assent to the defendants‟
release, suggesting that the district attorney may have been
motivated by political self-interest during an election year
in which his opponent publicly criticized how his office had
handled the case.
Id. at 469. Although the district attorney denied the allegation, id., there is
no doubt that high profile cases can lend themselves to such suspicions. See
generally Martin v. Hunter‟s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816) (“The
constitution has presumed . . . that state attachments, state prejudices, state
jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be
supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of justice.”). One
commentator has stated that, “if the state‟s trial system fails to protect an
individual, it is important for habeas corpus to safeguard the kind of injustice
that can result. In fact, historical interpretation shows that Congress enacted
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 to protect individuals against possible state
abuse.” Bradley, supra note 127, at 487.
151. See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 141, at 475-76.
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fear of these types of repercussions can prevent a prosecutor
from taking corrective action.152
This is precisely why the Second Circuit‟s actions in
Friedman represent such an important check on the system.
The court used its equitable powers in a prudent and
minimally intrusive way and asked that a significant claim of
innocence be reinvestigated. It provided the proper balance
between the interests of finality and federalism and a habeas
court‟s supervisory power to protect the integrity of the state‟s
criminal justice system.153 Indeed, while the Second Circuit‟s
action provided public pressure on the district attorney‟s office
to act, it also removed pressure on the office to refrain from
acting out of concern for how such action would appear to the
public. In other words, the court‟s actions provided cover to the
prosecutor to take remedial action in Friedman. Further, the
very threat that a federal court may make a public call for an
investigation may compel district attorney‟s offices to act on
their own to avoid the stigma and embarrassment that results
from such a call from a court.154
At the same time, there is an underlying concern that the
court‟s call for a reinvestigation will be illusory. There is
nothing that binds the prosecutor to reinvestigate the case.
Further, even if the prosecution agrees to reinvestigate the
152. Scheck, supra note 142, at 2237. Discussing the different reasons
why a prosecutor may not turn over Brady material out of fear: “[f]ear is a
powerful driver that can subvert almost any system or set of rules, and fear
of losing cases can powerfully subvert the better natures of both prosecutors
and defense lawyers engaged in an adversary system.” Id.
153. Zheng, supra note 122, at 2118 (one of writ‟s main goals is to ensure
“integrity of the criminal justice system”); Wolitz, supra note 22, at 1068
(“The habeas regime we constructed in the second half of the twentieth
century serves the important social interest of ensuring systemic compliance
to constitutional due process.”).
154. In an analogous context, one commentator has stated that threat of
federal habeas corpus review has “perhaps motivated state courts to conduct
their proceedings in a constitutional manner.” Zheng, supra note 122, at
2137. Similarly, another commentator has argued that the mere existence of
the North Carolina Innocence Commission, which is empowered to
investigate post-conviction claims of innocence, “serves to remind law
enforcement authorities that „winning‟ in front of a jury is not their goal;
rather, bringing to justice actual criminal perpetrators is the goal.” Wolitz,
supra note 22, at 1075.
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case, there will be no oversight of the reinvestigation. There is
no guarantee that the reinvestigation will be thorough or
meaningful.
Nonetheless, while real, these concerns do not militate
against the court issuing the call. Despite the lack of oversight,
criminal defendants clearly would prefer that these
investigations occur. In fact, Jesse‟s attorney himself
applauded the court for calling for the reinvestigation.155 For
an actually innocent defendant, a good faith investigation into
credible evidence of innocence opens the door, even if just a
crack, to the chance that justice will be done.156 It is also true
that a court is more willing to grant relief if the prosecutor
joins in a defendant‟s post-conviction motion.157 And it must be
emphasized that a prosecutor‟s “mission is not so much to
convict as it is to achieve a just result.”158 If done with a mind
to achieving justice, a prosecutor‟s reinvestigation could
certainly lead to an exoneration.

155. On the other hand, there is no doubt that defense attorneys will
remain somewhat skeptical of a prosecutor‟s agreement to reinvestigate a
case. For example, after the panel of advisors for the reinvestigation was
appointed, Ronald Kuby stated, “I was extraordinarily mistrustful of District
Attorney Rice‟s sudden change from obdurate obstructer [sic] to newfound
champion of justice . . . . But for once my cynicism appears to have been
misplaced.” Sean Gardiner, Review Slated for Abuse Case, WALL ST. J., Nov.
9, 2010, at A25. Presumably in an attempt to encourage prosecutors to agree
to reinvestigate cases, The Innocence Project honored the Harris County
District Attorney‟s Office for its work in its post-conviction unit. See
Innocence Project Honors District Attorney’s Post Conviction Review Section,
THE CYPRESS TIMES (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.thecypresstimes.com/article/N
ews/Local_News/INNOCENCE_PROJECT_HONORS_DISTRICT_ATTORN
EYS_POST_CONVICTION_REVIEW_SECTION/34865.
156. After pointing out that the Kings County district attorney had
established a section to establish post-conviction claims of innocence, a trial
level judge noted that he was aware of several cases in Kings County where
the prosecution had requested the court to vacate a conviction based upon
what was later determined to be an unjustified conviction. People v. Cole, 765
N.Y.S.2d 477, 483 (Sup. Ct. 2003); see also People v. Calabria, 816 N.E.2d
1257, 1260 (N.Y. 2004) (Rosenblatt, J., concurring).
157. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 141, at 486-87.
158. People v. Zimmer, 414 N.E.2d 705, 707 (N.Y. 1980). See also Green
& Yaroshefsky, supra note 141, at 505 (“Not only does the executive branch
have a constitutional obligation to free the innocent, it has a moral
responsibility to do so.”).
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Thus, the Second Circuit‟s call for a reinvestigation was a
creative, minimally intrusive, and meaningful step towards
addressing the persistent problem of wrongful convictions.
B. Actual Innocence Is a Central Component of Habeas Law
The more controversial aspect of the Second Circuit‟s
decision in Friedman was the court‟s focus on Jesse‟s claims of
innocence. Even though the call for a reinvestigation may have
been justified, that call was only made after a lengthy
discussion of the facts and circumstances of Jesse‟s case. But it
must be remembered that the actual legal claim raised in the
petition was both procedurally defective and substantively
meritless. Further, the claim itself did not require the court to
engage in a “lengthy discussion of the facts and circumstances”
of the case. The Brady claim failed for purely legal reasons—
impeachment evidence does not justify relief under Brady in
the plea context and the claim otherwise did not meet the
standard for granting habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Despite these clear logistical problems, the Friedman court
engaged in a lengthy discussion of the petitioner‟s potential
innocence.
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit headed down a proper
path in making actual innocence a central focus of the decision.
[C]oncern about the injustice that results from
the conviction of an innocent person has long
been at the core of our criminal justice system.
That concern is reflected . . . in the “fundamental
value determination of our society that it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a
guilty man go free.”159
Following that principle, the Supreme Court has clearly
provided that actually innocent persons “should be afforded
certain protections in order to „balance the societal interests in
159. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (quoting In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).

29

656

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:2

finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial resources
with the individual interest in justice that arises in the
extraordinary case.‟”160 As one commentator has stated,
“[i]nnocence is now unquestionably relevant to federal habeas
corpus review.”161
In his highly influential article from 1970, Second Circuit
Judge Henry Friendly urged that actual innocence play a
central role in habeas corpus jurisprudence.162 The article was
a response to the expansion of habeas corpus that occurred
after the Supreme Court‟s seminal decision in Brown v.
Allen,163 which brought several federal constitutional
challenges under the umbrella of federal court habeas review of
state court convictions.164 Judge Friendly complained that,
through this expansion of the doctrine, “the one thing almost
never suggested on collateral attack is that the prisoner was
innocent of the crime.”165 He suggested that, before a federal
court should entertain a habeas petition, a petitioner must
“supplement[ ] his constitutional plea with a colorable claim of
innocence.”166 He defined a colorable claim:

160. Sussman, supra note 119, at 378 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324
(1995)). See also Engle v. Issacs, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982) (“In appropriate
cases [the principles of finality and comity] must yield to the imperative of
correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.”).
161. Sussman, supra note 119, at 378. See also May & Viner, supra note
141, at 488 (“In these limited circumstances [i.e. when a state court is
unwilling or barred from considering actual innocence claims], federal courts
should seriously consider actual innocence claims so that the general fidelity
and respect for law, which is clearly an important federal issue, is not
undermined.”).
162. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 142, 150, 160 (1970-1971). In
fact, the influence of the article is still being felt today as even the Friedman
court cited to the article to justify its discussion of petitioner‟s actual
innocence. See Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 159 (2d Cir. 2010).
163. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). Brown actually was three cases heard
together: Brown v. Allen, Speller v. Allen, and Daniels v. Allen.
164. Friendly, supra note 162, at 143-45; see also Zheng, supra note 122,
at 2116-17 (discussing the expansion of the writ in the 1960‟s after the Brown
decision).
165. Friendly, supra note 162, at 145.
166. Id. at 142.
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The petitioner for collateral attack must show a
fair probability that, in light of all of the
evidence, including that alleged to have been
illegally admitted (but with due regard to any
reliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to
have been wrongfully excluded or to have become
available only after the trial, the trier of the facts
would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his
guilt.167
Ironically, while Judge Friendly suggested a focus on
actual innocence as a way to limit habeas review, notions of
actual innocence have actually been used to expand the writ‟s
availability. Over the years, several different types of actual
innocence theories have come into existence: (1) actual
innocence as a “gateway” claim to overcome a procedural
default to challenge a conviction;168 (2) actual innocence “to the
death penalty” as a “gateway” claim to overcome a procedural
default to challenge the imposition of a death sentence;169 and
(3) a freestanding actual innocence claim.170 As explained
below, two of these actual innocence claims—the first of the
gateway claims and the freestanding actual innocence claims—
could have easily been applied to Jesse‟s case. Before engaging
in that analysis, it is important to set forth the general
principles of these two innocence claims.
1. Actual Innocence Gateway Claim
Petitioner‟s face a variety of procedural barriers when
seeking habeas relief. Many habeas petitioners find their
claims procedurally defaulted based on a failure to properly
present the constitutional claim in state court.171 These
167. Id. at 160.
168. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315-16 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
169. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
170. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401 (1993). See generally Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
171. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-91 (1977). These
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procedural bars are typically justified out of concerns for
federalism and comity to state courts.172 In order to obtain
federal review of a procedurally-defaulted claim, a habeas
petitioner must establish cause and prejudice before obtaining
relief.173
In the 1986 case Murray v. Carrier,174 the Supreme Court
implemented the actual innocence exception to the procedural
default rule. The petitioner in Murray did not properly exhaust
the constitutional claim as he failed to raise it on direct appeal
in state court.175 The Court concluded that the claim was
procedurally defaulted and that the petitioner had not shown
cause for the default.176 The Court went on to state that “[i]n
appropriate cases” the principles of comity and finality that
inform the concepts of cause and prejudice “must yield to the
imperative
of
correcting
a
fundamentally
unjust
incarceration.”177 To ensure that this occurs, the Court
provided that, “in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is
actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ
even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural

procedural barriers include: the exhaustion doctrine—a petitioner must
utilize all available remedies to assert his constitutional claim in state court,
see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004)—and the
independent and adequate state law ground—a constitutional claim is barred
from federal review where a state court rejected the claim based on an
independent and adequate state procedural rule, see Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 729-31 (1991).
172. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730-31.
173. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982). “Cause” is defined as
“whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the
defense impeded counsel‟s efforts to comply with the State‟s procedural rule.”
Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. “Prejudice” is not as well-defined, but focuses on
“actual prejudice” to the petitioner resulting from the constitutional error.
Engle, 456 U.S. at 135. While difficult to quantify, the “actual prejudice”
standard is at least stricter than the “plain error” standard courts use on
direct appeal in criminal cases. Id.
174. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
175. Id. at 482-83, 490-93.
176. Id. at 492.
177. Id. at 495 (quoting Engle, 456 U.S. at 135) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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default.”178
In the 1993 case Schlup v. Delo,179 the Supreme Court fully
defined the contours of this new “gateway” actual innocence
claim. A gateway innocence claim must be grounded in “new
reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific
evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical
evidence—that was not presented at trial.”180 Once it is
determined that the evidence is reliable, a habeas court must
consider the actual innocence claim in light of the evidence in
the record as a whole.181 If the court concludes that, in light of
all of the evidence, it is “more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt,” a petitioner may proceed through the
gateway, and the court can address the merits of the
underlying claim.182
In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which drastically altered habeas
law to place significant restrictions on the availability of the
writ to state prisoners.183 One of the main restrictions was the
imposition of a one-year statute of limitations upon the filing of
a federal habeas petition.184 The statute provides different
dates from which the time period can begin to run: either “the
conclusion of direct review”;185 “the date on which the
impediment to filing” the claim was removed;186 “the date on
which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized
178. Id. at 496. On the same day as Murray, the Supreme Court decided
Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986). The case concerned the situations
under which a habeas court could consider a claim in a second or successive
petition that had been raised in an earlier petition. Id. at 438. Relying
heavily on Judge Friendly‟s article, a plurality of the Court concluded that
such claims are barred from further review unless a petitioner “supplements
his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence.” Id. at
454 (plurality opinion).
179. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
180. Id. at 324.
181. Id. at 327-28.
182. Id. at 327.
183. Zheng, supra note 122, at 2111-14.
184. Id. at 2113; see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2006).
185. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
186. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(B).
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by the Supreme Court”;187 or “the date on which the factual
predicate of the claim . . . could have been discovered through
the exercise of due diligence.”188 The statute also allows tolling
of the time period during which a properly filed application for
post-conviction relief was pending in state court.189 Although
the statute does not provide an actual innocence exception to
the statute of limitations period, the Second Circuit has
extended the “gateway” innocence claim to excuse a late filing
from the one-year statute of limitations.190
2. Freestanding Actual Innocence Claim
A freestanding actual innocence claim is rooted in several
different concepts: substantive due process,191 procedural due
process,192 and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.193
Despite the broad foundation, the Supreme Court has yet to
establish a free-standing actual innocence claim.194 In fact, no
federal court has ever granted relief on such a claim.195 There is
a strong indication from Supreme Court case law, however,
that such a claim does exist. In fact, as a result of a 2009
decision from the Court, it would appear that the existence of

187. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(C).
188. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(D).
189. Id. § 2244(d)(2).
190. Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 161 (2d Cir. 2004).
191. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 431-35 (1993) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 829 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J.,
dissenting); In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *43 (S.D. Ga.
Aug. 24, 2010); May & Viner, supra note 141, at 494-95; Mourer, supra note
20, at 1298, 1306-09.
192. Eli Paul Mazur, “I’m Innocent”: Addressing Freestanding Claims of
Actual Innocence in State and Federal Courts, 25 N.C. CENT. L.J. 197, 237-39
(2003).
193. See, e.g., Herrera, 506 U.S. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); In re
Davis, 565 F.3d at 830 (Barkett, J., dissenting); Mourer, supra note 20, at
1298, 1309-10. See generally In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
194. Dist. Attorney‟s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct.
2308, 2321 (2009).
195. Berg, supra note 23, at 136-37.
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this type of claim has now become inevitable.196
The Supreme Court first addressed the question of a
freestanding innocence claim in Herrera v. Collins.197 The
majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, found
that a claim of actual innocence did not state an independent
constitutional claim cognizable in a federal habeas petition, so
long as the state allowed a defendant to obtain executive
clemency based on actual innocence.198 Nevertheless, the
majority assumed for the sake of argument that such a claim
could exist.199 It stated that, for a defendant to be successful on
such a claim, he would need to make an “extraordinarily high”
threshold showing, which Herrera had not done.200
Despite the majority‟s opinion, a “shadow majority” of at
least five of the judges did conclude that a freestanding actual
innocence claim does exist.201 In a concurring opinion joined by
Justice Kennedy, Justice O‟Connor stated, “I cannot disagree
with the fundamental legal principle that executing the
innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution.”202 Justice
White, also concurring, “assume[d] that a persuasive showing
of „actual innocence‟ made after trial . . . would render
unconstitutional the execution of [a] petitioner.”203 Further, in
196. Scheck, supra note 142, at 2251-52 (“There seems little doubt that if
the appropriate case gets there, the Supreme Court will confirm that proof of
actual innocence does state a constitutional claim.”).
197. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
198. Id. at 398-417.
199. Id. at 417.
200. Id. at 417.
201. In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 829 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J.,
dissenting); Sacco v. Greene, No. 04-CV-2391, 2007 WL 432966, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2007); Berg, supra note 23, at 129; Greg Bylinksky,
Herrera v. Collins: A New Innocence Principle?, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J.
191, 192, 199-200 (1994).
202. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 419 (O‟Connor, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 429 (White, J., concurring). Justice White‟s concurring
opinion is most notable for the standard he set for potential freestanding
claims: “petitioner . . . [must] show that based on proffered newly discovered
evidence and the entire record before the jury that convicted him, „no rational
trier of fact could . . . [find] proof of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.‟” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324
(1979)). “[M]ost courts tend to follow the standard set out in Justice White‟s
concurring opinion for the requisite standard for free-standing actual
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dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens and
Souter, stated that a free-standing actual innocence claim did
exist under the Due Process and Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clauses.204 Notably, in Schlup v. Delo, the
Supreme Court seemed to acknowledge that such a substantive
innocence claim could be asserted if the evidence of innocence
was “strong enough to make his execution „constitutionally
intolerable.‟”205
It now appears, however, that the Supreme Court has
thrown the door wide open to the potential of a freestanding
actual innocence claim.206 In In re Davis,207 the Court
considered the original writ of habeas corpus of Troy Davis. 208
In the very brief opinion, the Court ordered that “[t]he [d]istrict
[c]ourt should receive testimony and make findings of fact as to
whether evidence that could not have been obtained at the time
of trial clearly establishes petitioner‟s innocence.”209
innocence claims.” Mathis, supra note 134, at 822.
204. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 430-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In his
inimical style, Justice Blackmun stated, “Nothing could be more contrary to
contemporary standards of decency, or more shocking to the conscience, than
to execute a person who is actually innocent.” Id. at 430 (internal citations
omitted). See also In re Davis, 565 F.3d at 830 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“I do
not believe that any member of a civilized society could disagree that
executing an innocent person would be an atrocious violation of our
Constitution and the principles upon which it is based.”).
205. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995).
206. Mourer, supra note 20, at 1279.
207. 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009).
208. Id. An “original writ” is distinct from a regular petition filed under
28 U.S.C. § 2254. An original writ relies on the Supreme Court‟s power to
consider a habeas petition under Supreme Court Rule 20.4(a), 28 U.S.C. §§
2241(b), 1651(a), and the Court‟s original jurisdiction under Article III of the
U.S. Constitution. See Byrnes v. Walker, 371 U.S. 937 (1962).
209. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1. The real battle in Davis occurred
between the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens and the dissenting opinion
of Justice Scalia. In dissent, Justice Scalia pointed out it would be impossible
for the district court to grant relief here since its power was restricted under
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which only allows a grant of habeas where petitioner
can show that the state court “adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States.” Id. at 2-3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). Because the question of whether a freestanding actual innocence claim exists is an open question, there was no
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The district court then held a hearing on the factual
matters, but denied relief.210 Before addressing the factual
matters presented at the hearing, the court indicated that it
felt compelled to decide whether or not a freestanding actual
innocence claim was cognizable under the Federal
Constitution.211 In an exhaustive and compelling analysis, the
court concluded that the execution of an innocent person would
violate the Eighth Amendment‟s Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause.212
As can be seen in response to Davis, the court that was
required to address the freestanding actual innocence issue
concluded that such a claim does exist under the Federal
Constitution.213 This decision builds upon the prior indications
from the Supreme Court that such a claim may exist upon a
truly persuasive showing of innocence. As a result, “[t]here
seems little doubt that if the appropriate case gets there, the
Supreme Court will confirm that proof of actual innocence does
state a constitutional claim.”214 The “lurking probability”215 of
clearly established law on this principle. Id. at 3. Justice Stevens disagreed.
He stated that the district court could conclude that § 2254(d) did not apply
to an original writ or applied in only a modified form. Id. at 1 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). He suggested that the habeas statute may be unconstitutional to
the extent that it restricted “relief for a death row inmate who has
established his innocence.” Id. He further opined that a court could conclude
that Supreme Court precedent does support a finding of a constitutional
violation. Id. at 1-2 (citing In re Davis, 565 F.3d at 830 (Barkett, J.,
dissenting)).
210. In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24,
2010).
211. Id. at *37-39 & n.15.
212. Id. at *37-43. Notably, in its decision, the district court did not
address the § 2254(d)(1) question raised by Justice Scalia in his dissent. See
supra note 209. The only reasonable conclusion to draw from this lack of
analysis is that the district court believed that there was clearly established
law to support its conclusion, something that Justice Stevens suggested in his
concurrence. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1-2.
213. Davis filed a cert. petition directly with the Supreme Court, but the
petition was denied. Davis v. Humphrey, 131 S. Ct. 1787 (Mar. 28, 2011).
214. Scheck, supra note 142, at 2251 (arguing that the Court‟s actions in
Davis in conjunction with the fact that six Justices in Herrera had “expressly
[taken] the position that truly persuasive „freestanding‟ innocence claim
would clearly be cognizable” supported the conclusion that the Court would
conclude in the appropriate case that such a claim does exist). See also
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this claim underscores the critical role that federal courts have
in ensuring that an innocent defendant does not suffer an
unjust incarceration.
Thus, the Second Circuit‟s actions in calling for a
reinvestigation out of a concern of a possible injustice were
fully justified. It carefully balanced the equitable principles
present in habeas jurisprudence. It showed respect for the
finality of the conviction and affirmed state sovereignty while,
at the same time, sought to ensure protection of a potentially
innocent petitioner. It was consistent with the current trend in
our criminal justice system in which prosecutors have
developed post-conviction investigatory units. Finally, the
court‟s focus on actual innocence was in line with the expansive
role that innocence plays in habeas law. In the end, the call for
a reinvestigation was a prudent and reasonable approach to
address a possible injustice.
III. Actual Innocence Claim Under the New York State
Constitution
In Friedman, the court noted that Jesse still had the
potential to obtain relief in state court pursuing the actual
innocence claim.216 It noted that some trial level courts in New
York had acknowledged the existence of a freestanding actual
innocence claim under the New York State Constitution.217 But
if this possibility of relief existed, then it could be argued that
the Second Circuit should not have reached out and called for a
reinvestigation of the case. In fact, a reinvestigation may not
even be necessary as Jesse may be able to obtain in court the
ultimate relief that a reinvestigation would have provided—an
exoneration.
Even with the existence of the relatively new actual

Mourer, supra note 20, at 1279 (as a result of its decision Davis, “[f]or the
first time in history, the Supreme Court . . . has come close to recognizing this
reality” of a freestanding actual innocence claim).
215. Scheck, supra note 142, at 2251.
216. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 159.
217. Id.
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innocence claim under state law, however, the call for a
reinvestigation was still a necessary and important step. The
call for a reinvestigation addresses the concern that, despite
compelling new evidence of innocence, a defendant still may
fall short of the demanding standard to establish an actual
innocence claim. Under such a situation, a call for a
reinvestigation would work to bolster society‟s confidence in the
criminal justice system as it would provide an assurance that
those highly credible claims of innocence have not been
ignored, but instead have been fully explored.
A.

Freestanding Actual Innocence under the New York State
Constitution

In 2003 Justice John M. Leventhal, a New York State
Supreme Court Justice in Brooklyn, became the first New York
State judge to acknowledge the existence of a freestanding
actual innocence claim under the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of section 5218 and the due process clause of
section 6219 of article I of the New York State Constitution.220
Justice Leventhal opened his opinion in People v. Cole with
commentary on the meaning of a jury‟s verdict after trial.221 He
stated that, in “American jurisprudence,” an acquittal does not
necessarily mean that defendant “did not actually commit the
crime,” only that the prosecution had failed to prove one of its
elements beyond a reasonable doubt.222 On the other hand, a
guilty verdict only indicated that the government had met its
burden, but not that the defendant had, with all certainty,
committed the crime.223 After acknowledging the limitations of
218. Utilizing the same language as the federal Constitution, section 5
provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed,
nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be
unreasonably detained.” N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5.
219. Section 6 enumerates almost all of the numerous positive rights for
criminal defendants including “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.” Id. § 6.
220. People v. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d 477, 484-85 (Sup. Ct. 2003).
221. Id. at 478.
222. Id..
223. Id.
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our criminal justice system, Justice Leventhal stated that the
issue in Cole was “what is a court‟s role when” a defendant
makes a claim of actual innocence in a post-conviction motion,
even though the defendant‟s conviction was procedurally
proper in every other way.224 The court viewed its task as
answering several questions, such as “what is the legal basis
for the innocence claim? What criteria should a court use in
determining, post judgment, the actual innocence of a
defendant? If the court finds that a convicted person is in fact
innocent, what is the appropriate remedy?”225
Justice Leventhal noted that, in Herrera, the Supreme
Court had refused to hold that a freestanding actual innocence
claim existed under the Federal Constitution, so long as the
state provided a possibility of a pardon based on actual
innocence.226 Since New York provides for such a pardon, a
New York inmate could not raise a claim under the Federal
Constitution.227
The judge pointed out, however, that “[t]he New York
State Constitution grants an accused greater rights than those
provided in the Federal Constitution.”228 “These . . . rights were
granted to an accused in order to protect an innocent person
from improper conviction.”229 For example, the state of New
York “affords an accused broader rights to counsel than the
Federal Constitution in order to insure that „the innocent go

224. Id.
225. Id. The judge also raised the question of whether separation of
powers barred the court from considering the issue. Id. After reviewing the
pardon process in New York, the court concluded that it remained a judicial
function to: (i) “determine whether the New York State Constitution bars the
conviction or the jailing of an actually innocent individual”; and (ii) “vacate a
court judgment which violates the [c]onstitution.” Id. at 539.
226. Id. at 484.
227. Id. (citing N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 19 (McKinney 2010)).
228. Id.; accord, e.g., People v. Bermudez, No. 8759/91, 2009 WL
3823270, at *23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 9, 2009) (“[P]rocedural mechanism . . . for
an incarcerated defendant to bring a post-conviction motion upon a claim of
actual innocence” must exist under the New York State Constitution because
the “[c]onstitution provides a state prisoner alleging actual innocence with
greater protection than the [F]ederal [C]onstitution.”).
229. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
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free.‟”230 Other state constitutional rights that have been
interpreted more broadly than their federal counterparts also
focus on protecting the innocent. These include the right of an
accused to be present at trial,231 the requirement of indictment
by grand jury,232 and a bar against the introduction of
suggestive identification procedures.233
As Justice Leventhal emphasized, “[o]ur Court of Appeals
has recognized that the function of a criminal prosecution and
the interest of society is to convict the guilty and to acquit the
innocent.”234 The broad rights ingrained in the state
constitution are meant to insure that the guiltless are not
placed under unnecessary restraint.235 He concluded that “the
ends of acquitting the non-guilty is an essential part of the
constitution.”236
The judge reasoned that the due process clause required
that the government grant “elemental fairness” to an
accused.237 “Further, a person who has not committed any
crime has a liberty interest in remaining free from
punishment.”238 He held that, for these reasons, “the conviction
or incarceration of a guiltless person violates elemental
fairness, deprives that person of freedom of movement and
freedom from punishment and thus runs afoul of the [d]ue
[p]rocess [c]lause of the [s]tate [c]onstitution.”239 He also
determined that the punishment of “an actually innocent
person is disproportionate to the crime (or lack of crime)
committed and violates the cruel and inhuman treatment
clause.”240
230. Id. at 485 (quoting People v. Claudio, 629 N.E.2d 384, 386 (N.Y.
1993)).
231. People v. Mullen, 3744 N.E.2d 369, 370 (N.Y. 1978).
232. People v. Infante, 511 N.Y.S.2d 293, 296 (App. Div. 1987).
233. People v. Gee, 782 N.E.2d 1155, 1157-58 (N.Y. 2002).
234. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 485 (citing People v. Roselle, 643 N.E.2d 72,
75 (N.Y. 1994)).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. (citing People v. Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915, 919 (N.Y. 1990)).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. In line with Justice Leventhal‟s conclusion, courts in other
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Once he had concluded that a freestanding innocence claim
existed under the state constitution, Justice Leventhal turned
to the standard that should be used to determine whether a
defendant has made the requisite showing of actual innocence.
He reviewed the differing views of what the proper standard
should be for such claims and stated that the standard must
balance the interests of finality, the societal interest in seeing
that an innocent person not face conviction or punishment, and
the interest of an individual who has not committed a crime to
remain at liberty.241
Balancing those interests, the judge concluded that, to
establish actual innocence, a defendant must demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror could
convict the defendant of the crimes for which he was
convicted.242 Critically, Leventhal concluded that all credible
evidence may be considered, including new evidence, whether
or not that new evidence satisfies the typical factors used to
judge whether it would justify a new trial.243 On a claim of
states had concluded that their state constitutions also provided for freestanding actual innocence claims. People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ill.
1996); Montoya v. Ulibarri, 163 P.3d 476 (N.M. 2007). See also In re Clark,
855 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1993); Miller v. Comm‟r of Corr., 700 A.2d 1108 (Conn.
1997); State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); Ex
parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex Crim. App. 1996). Other states have
reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Heffernan v. State, No. CR 02-239,
2002 WL 1303388 (Ark. June 13, 2002); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072
(Fla. 2008); State v. Placzkiewicz, 36 P.3d 934 (Mont. 2001); Pellegrini v.
State, 34 P.3d 519 (Nev. 2001); State v. Byrd, 762 N.E.2d 1043 (Ohio Ct. App.
2001); State v. Ratliff, 71 S.W.3d 291 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); Reedy v. Wright,
60 Va. Cir. 18 (2002).
241. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
242. Id.
243. Id. These are typically referred to as the Salemi factors. To
constitute newly discovered evidence justifying a new trial, the evidence: 1.
must be able to
change the result if a new trial is granted; 2. . . . must have
been discovered since the trial; 3. . . . could not have been
discovered before the trial by the exercise of due diligence;
4. . . . must be material to the issue; 5. . . . must not be
cumulative . . . ; and, 6. . . . must not be merely impeaching
or contradicting the former evidence.
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actual innocence a court should admit “any reliable evidence
whether in admissible form or not . . . because the focus is on
factual innocence and not on whether the government can
prove the defendant‟s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”244
Finally, the judge considered what the proper remedy
would be, namely a dismissal of the accusatory instrument.245
He explained that this was the appropriate remedy because a
defendant who proves his innocence by clear and convincing
evidence has demonstrated that “there is no reasonable juror
who could convict,” and therefore, there was no reason to order
a new trial.246 He pointed out that, if a new trial was ordered
and the petitioner was convicted again, the second conviction
would be equally unconstitutional because there existed clear
and convincing evidence that no jury could reasonably convict
the defendant.247
After Justice Leventhal‟s landmark decision in Cole, two
other trial judges who have explicitly addressed the issue have
concluded that such a claim may be raised.248 Further, several
People v. Salemi, 128 N.E.2d 377, 381 (N.Y. 1955) (quoting People v. Priori,
58 N.E. 668, 672 (N.Y. 1900)). These factors supplement and clarify the
statutory right to obtain a new trial under New York law, which provides
that a court should vacate a conviction where:
New evidence has been discovered since the entry of a
judgment based upon a verdict of guilty after trial, which
could not have been produced by the defendant at the trial
even with due diligence on his part and which is of such
character as to create a probability that had such evidence
been received at the trial the verdict would have been more
favorable to the defendant; provided that a motion based
upon such ground must be made with due diligence after
the discovery of such alleged new evidence.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(g) (McKinney 2010).
244. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 486 (citations omitted).
245. Id. at 487.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. People v. Bermudez, No. 8759/91, 2009 WL 3823270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Nov. 9, 2009); People v. Wheeler-Whichard, 884 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup. Ct. 2009).
The Wheeler-Whichard court concluded:
[I]t would be abhorrent to my sense of justice and fair play
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other courts have assumed that a claim of actual innocence was
cognizable, even though the defendant in those cases failed to
prove he was actually innocent.249
B.

Does the Existence of the Freestanding Actual Innocence
Claim Render a Call for Reinvestigation Unnecessary?

It cannot be denied that the establishment of the
freestanding actual innocence claim is a critical step towards
addressing the fundamental problem of wrongful convictions in
the New York State criminal justice system. Wrongfully
convicted defendants now have a legal mechanism to raise
their claims in state court—even if they are relying on newly
discovered evidence that would not meet the requirements to
justify a new trial. In fact, two defendants have been able to
obtain relief under this newly-established claim.250
The existence of this new claim, however, does not render
the court‟s action in Friedman unnecessary. Despite the
availability of relief under the state constitution, it remains the
case that the standard for obtaining that relief is exceedingly
high. A clear and convincing level of proof is an exacting
standard. As Justice Leventhal stated in Cole, such a high level

to do other than to vacate defendant's convictions . . . and to
declare that he is innocent of this horrible murder, and to
ensure he does not continue to serve any more time in
prison for these convictions.
Id. at 314. These courts have also adopted Justice Leventhal‟s standard for
establishing innocence. Bermudez, 2009 WL 3823270, at *22; WheelerWhichard, 884 N.Y.S.2d at 7313-14. See also People v. Days, No. 0469/01,
2009 WL 5191433 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. Dec. 31, 2009). No appellate court in New
York, however, has yet addressed these issues. See generally People v.
Tankleff, 848 N.Y.S.2d 286, 303 (App. Div. 2007) (declining to address
whether a freestanding claim is cognizable under the state constitution).
249. See, e.g., Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *13 (citing People v. Bryant,
No. 3520/96, 2009 WL 3134841 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 14, 2009); People v.
Bellamy, No. 194/94, 2008 WL 3271995 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 27, 2008); People
v. Bozella, No. 102/83, 2009 WL 3364575 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. Oct. 14, 2009)).
250. Bermudez, 2009 WL 3823270, at *38; Wheeler-Whichard, 884
N.Y.S.2d at 313-14.
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of proof is necessary to balance all of the competing interests.251
It is a certainty, however, that some defendants will be able to
come forward with compelling evidence of innocence that falls
short of reaching the high standard to justify a dismissal of the
accusatory instrument. And while two defendants have been
able to obtain relief under this new claim, it does not alter the
fact that other defendants with a real claim to innocence
simply cannot reach the elevated evidentiary level. Such a
reality is simply a natural result of how stringent the
constitutional standard must be.
But in such a case, that compelling claim of innocence can
work to undermine the public‟s confidence in the criminal
justice system.252 As previously stated, it is a “fundamental
value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict
an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”253 Although
a defendant in such a situation may not have enough evidence
to be entitled to relief, real questions can be raised about the
reliability of the conviction where a defendant has a legitimate
claim to innocence. A call for reinvestigation serves to mollify
such concerns without upsetting the finality of the
conviction.254 In fact, upon further investigation, additional
251. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
252. See Segal, supra note 20, at 249. The article discusses what one
professor described as the “innocence gap”—the amount of exculpatory
evidence sufficient to generate a profound sense of public discomfort with a
conviction compared to the amount necessary to trigger a federal court‟s
willingness to excuse a procedural default under Schlup. Id. It quotes an
example from the same professor that suggests that a “large segment of the
public undoubtedly would feel profoundly disquieted if they believed there
was a fifty-fifty chance that a person whose constitutional rights may have
been violated, and who was about to be executed, was actually innocent of
any crime.” Id. at 250 (quoting Todd E. Pettys, Killing Roger Coleman:
Habeas, Finality, and the Innocence Gap, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2313, 2350
(2007)). See also Segal, supra note 20, at 238 (“[P]ublic fear and distrust
arises [sic] as a result of incarcerating the innocent.”); Zheng, supra note 122,
at 2136 (“Even if society can tolerate crooked prosecutors and incompetent
lawyers in exchange for speedy justice as long as the system seemingly
punishes the guilty, depriving the innocent of life and liberty would
completely undermine the public‟s confidence in our criminal justice
system.”).
253. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (quoting In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
254. See generally Segal, supra note 20, at 250-51 (habeas law that does
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evidence could be discovered that would either support or
undermine the innocence claim. In either situation, the goals of
the criminal justice system are advanced.
Indeed, the decision in Cole itself provides a good example
of a situation where the freestanding actual innocence claim
fails to fully address a potential wrongful conviction. Although
Justice Leventhal determined in Cole that a freestanding
actual innocence claim does exist, he concluded that the
defendant had not met the high standard for relief.255
Nevertheless, his ultimate decision clearly left reason for the
reader to feel uncomfortable about the reliability of the
conviction.
Cole had been convicted of first-degree manslaughter
based on the shooting of Michael Jennings on a street corner in
Brooklyn.256 During the initial investigation, various witnesses,
including one named Fleming,257 identified people other than
the defendant as the shooter. Each of the people identified were
ruled out as suspects. Two eyewitnesses, including a man
named Jeffrey Campbell, eventually identified Cole as the
shooter.258 In his defense, Cole called an alibi witness.259 In
addition, he also called another eyewitness who testified that
he was not the shooter.260 So the evidence at trial, while strong,
not take into account public‟s response to newly discovered evidence is “poorly
calculated to assure the public that the „ends of justice‟ have been achieved”
and those deserving of relief have obtained it (quoting Pettys, supra note 252,
at 2352)).
255. People v. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d 477, 487-88 (Sup. Ct. 2003).
256. Id. at 479.
257. In the decision on Cole‟s habeas corpus petition, the district court
judge identified Fleming as Winston Fleming. Cole v. Walsh, No. 05-CV-736,
2009 WL 3124771, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009). The judge noted that
Fleming had told the police that the shooter worked for someone named
“Scotty.” Id. The investigating detective, however, never connected Cole to
“Scotty” and did not even interview “Scotty.” Id.
258. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 479. It is notable that Campbell actually was
originally arrested when a police officer saw him fleeing from the scene. Id. at
479 n.1. He was later released, however, based on evidence that he was not
the shooter. Id. He also received a benefit in his pending criminal case in
exchange for his testimony. Cole, 2009 WL 3124771, at *1. The other
eyewitness was named Charles Ford. Id.
259. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
260. Id.
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did raise some questions about Cole‟s guilt.
Several years after his conviction, Cole filed his section
440.10 motion. Justice Leventhal held a hearing on the motion
at which four eyewitnesses testified that Cole was not the
shooter.261 Instead, they all identified a man named “Denzel” as
the shooter.262 Each of these witnesses, however, had criminal
records.263 In addition to these witnesses, Cole presented a
videotaped statement from Campbell in which he recanted.264
Justice Leventhal determined that Cole had failed to
establish that he was innocent by clear and convincing
evidence.265 He pointed out that Cole‟s witnesses had credibility
problems and that their testimony was inconsistent with
documentary evidence and testimony from police officers at the
hearing.266 The judge rejected their testimony that they had
spoken to police officers during the investigation.267 He also
faulted their delay in coming forward. He found evidence that
Cole or a person on his behalf threatened and bribed
witnesses.268
On the other hand, the judge also found significant reasons
to think that there had been a wrongful conviction.269 He
pointed out the critical fact that “[a]ll the descriptions given to
the police at the time of the incident do not match that of the
defendant‟s appearance at the time of the crime.”270 He also
concluded that there were reasons to believe Cole‟s witnesses—
there was nothing in their demeanor to question their
reliability and their testimony was consistent with each other

261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. An investigator for petitioner testified that Ford had recanted to
him. Cole v. Walsh, No. 05-CV-736, 2009 WL 3124771, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
29, 2009). However, Ford later testified that he never recanted and he stood
by his testimony. Id.
265. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 481.
268. Id. at 487.
269. Id.
270. Id.

47

674

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:2

and with Cole‟s trial witnesses.271
Nevertheless, Leventhal concluded that the combination of
these factors did not represent “clear and convincing evidence
that no reasonable juror could convict the defendant.”272
However, the judge did not end his decision there. He found
that, for the purpose of “completeness” and should the
appellate court adopt a different standard for an innocence
claim, “that the defendant has shown that he is probably
innocent (more likely than not approximating 55%).”273
Thus, Cole stands as a good example of where the
freestanding actual innocence claim does not do enough to
address a compelling claim of innocence. The judge concluded
that Cole was probably innocent. But this 55 percent innocent
defendant must remain under restraint pursuant to what could
be an unjust conviction. This result undermines confidence in
the criminal justice system. Even with its protections and
various post-conviction remedies, our legal system could have
failed to prevent a wrongful conviction.
Such concerns could have been alleviated here with a call
for a reinvestigation.274 The utility of further investigation is
apparent from the decision itself—it shows that the police

271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. It should be noted that, in September 2009, a district court judge
denied Cole‟s habeas petition. Cole v. Walsh, No. 05-CV-736, 2009 WL
3124771, at *7-8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009). After assuming, for the sake of
the analysis, that an actual innocence claim exists under the Federal
Constitution, the judge concluded that Cole had not even met the lower
Schlup gateway standard. Id. at *6. In her analysis, the judge took a far more
negative view towards Cole‟s claim of innocence than Justice Leventhal,
finding that the credibility of the defense witnesses was “severely
undermine[d]”—a factual finding that Leventhal did not make in his opinion.
Id. She also did not defer to Leventhal‟s conclusion that Cole was “probably
innocent.” Id. Nevertheless, the decision is not inconsistent with a call for a
reinvestigation under Friedman. As discussed infra notes 289-90 and the
accompanying text, the Friedman standard is lower than the Schlup
standard. Under that standard, Cole‟s factual presentation could potentially
justify a call for further investigation under the framework set up in
Friedman. Because Cole pre-dates the Friedman decision, the district judge
obviously did not have the benefit of Friedman to determine whether to make
such a call for a reinvestigation.
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received disparate information in their investigation, some of
which was never fully investigated.275 With the new
information provided by the defense, further investigation
could have allowed the police to harmonize the evidence in
their files, providing a possible lead on a way to identify the
shooter. And while a hearing was held and Cole‟s witnesses
were allowed to testify, that does not run counter to further
investigation. Despite the ability to explore the factual
allegations at the hearing, the government‟s position at the
hearing was adversarial. From the decision itself, it is clear
that the prosecution‟s goal at the hearing was simply to do
what it took to defeat the motion. That is a qualitatively
different posture than having investigators explore the
credibility of the new evidence through further investigation
which could potentially further petitioner‟s claim of
innocence.276 Indeed, the Second Circuit asserted in Friedman
that, even if the prosecution should take an adverse position to
Jesse in post-conviction proceedings, the case would still
benefit from a “complete review” by the prosecution.277 This
review provides an important assurance that all legitimate
claims of innocence will be fully explored to ensure that no
injustice has occurred.

275. As discussed supra note 257 and accompanying text, various
witnesses, including one named Fleming, identified people other than the
defendant as the shooter. However, each of the people who were identified
were ruled out as a suspect. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 479; see also Cole, 2009 WL
3124771 at *1. Additionally, Fleming had told the police that the shooter
worked for someone named “Scotty.” Cole, 2009 WL 3124771 at *1. The
investigating detective, however, never connected Cole to “Scotty” and did not
even interview “Scotty.” Id. Further, it does not appear that the police ever
investigated the evidence presented by the defense witnesses at the postconviction hearing that the shooter was a “Guyanese individual, known as
„Denzel,‟ „GT,‟ or „Dooley,‟” even though one of these witnesses may have
mentioned it to the police during the investigation. Cole, 2009 WL 3124771 at
*2 & n.3.
276. Osborne v. Dist. Attorney‟s Office for Third Judicial Dist., 521 F.3d
1118, 1139 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that, even though prosecution may seek to
reinvestigate to try and fight Osborne‟s claim to innocence, “such an
investigation might instead lead in the opposite direction and further solidify
Osborne‟s case for innocence”), rev’d on other grounds, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2321
(2009).
277. Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 160 (2d Cir. 2010).
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IV. The Framework of a Friedman Call for a Reinvestigation
The final question is whether the Friedman decision will
have any impact on future cases. To be sure, the court‟s actions
in Friedman have no precedential value. The call for a
reinvestigation was clearly done in dicta. The court had already
rejected the Brady claim as both procedurally defaulted and, in
the alternative, on the merits. As a result, no federal court in
New York is now required to consider whether to issue a call
for a reinvestigation.
Nevertheless, the same reasons that justified the Second
Circuit‟s actions in Friedman would justify any other federal
habeas court in making the same call for a reinvestigation.
Once again, it is a balanced approach that furthers the federal
court‟s critically important role of ensuring that a potentially
innocent defendant does not suffer an unjust incarceration.
However, the true innovation of the Friedman decision is that,
beyond opening the door for federal courts to consider making a
call for a reinvestigation in the appropriate case, the court
established a responsible mechanism for determining when
such a call should happen.
The final part of this Article will first discuss the novelty of
the court‟s approach in calling for the reinvestigation. Then,
the article will break down the mechanism that the court used
to provide guidance on how federal courts can apply it in future
cases.
A. The Mechanism Used in the Friedman Decision Was a
Novel Approach to Considering a Petitioner’s Allegation of
Actual Innocence
The two actual innocence theories applicable to non-capital
habeas cases, the gateway and freestanding actual innocence
claims, clearly were applicable to the Friedman case. In
Friedman, the court concluded that the petition was
procedurally defective because it was untimely under the one-
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year statute of limitations.278 Thus, the gateway innocence
claim was a route available to the court to address the actual
innocence claim. In fact, it could be reasonably argued that the
court should not have addressed the merits of the Brady claim
at all unless it had first addressed the gateway innocence claim
and concluded that it could consider a claim that was untimely.
The court specifically declined, however, to address the actual
innocence claim in this posture.279
It is also clear that the court could have easily addressed
the actual innocence claim as a substantive freestanding claim.
The court did not, however, frame its analysis in that way. In
fact, the court sidestepped the issue entirely, saying that it did
not have the authority to grant relief on the claim since it was
unexhausted.280 But the court could have easily navigated
around that procedural issue—at least to the extent that it
wanted to address the merits of the claim without going so far
as granting relief. A federal court has the power to stay and
hold a petition to allow for a petitioner to exhaust a claim in
state court so long as the claim to be exhausted is not “plainly
meritless.”281 Thus, in service of the freestanding actual
278. Id. at 152.
279. Id.
280. It is true that the claim was unexhausted, but it is not clear that a
meaningful remedy was available to Jesse. In New York, a court “may” deny
a motion to vacate where a defendant was in a position to adequately raise
the issue but did not do so. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(3)(c) (McKinney
2010). Thus, the state court would not be required to consider the claim but
could dismiss for the sole reason that it was not raised at an earlier time. Id.
On the other hand, the court also has the discretion to grant the motion “in
the interest of justice and for good cause shown” where the claim has merit.
Id.
281. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005); Zarvela v. Artuz, 254
F.3d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding a stay of petition is “preferable” in
“many cases” where petitioner has unexhausted claims). This “stay and
abeyance” procedure also requires that the petitioner show “good cause” for
the failure to exhaust the claim. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. This is a lenient
standard that would not have presented any hurdle for the Second Circuit.
Indeed, a generalized claim of “reasonable confusion” is sufficient to establish
“good cause.” Whitley v. Ercole, 509 F. Supp. 2d 410, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(adopting dicta from Pace v. DiGugliemo, 544 U.S. 408, 416 (2005)). Here, the
court could have easily found that Jesse harbored “reasonable confusion” over
whether a freestanding actual innocence claim existed or whether it would
apply to a defendant who had pled guilty.
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innocence claim, the court could have easily reviewed the
merits of the unexhausted claim.
The court chose, however, not to link its discussion to any
recognized actual innocence theory. Indeed, as Judge Raggi
pointed out, the court reviewed the factual allegations in a
different way than would appear to be allowed under either a
gateway innocence claim or a freestanding innocence claim.
Instead of pursuing a recognized theory, the court charted a
new course and directly linked its extended discussion of the
facts and circumstances to its desire to call for a
reinvestigation. While it certainly is not novel for a court to call
for a reinvestigation,282 the true innovation of the court‟s
approach is that it only made the call after determining that
the factual allegations had met a certain standard justifying
further investigation. More specifically, the call was only made
once the court concluded that there was substantial “new and
material evidence” that created a reasonable likelihood of a
wrongful conviction. This was a creative and reasonable
approach, as it simply utilized an existing standard that the
prosecution was already bound to follow.283 And that is the real
value of Friedman for future cases—it established a
responsible and workable mechanism for determining whether
a habeas court should exercise its equitable powers to call for a
reinvestigation.

282. For example, in a concurring opinion in People v. Calabria, New
York Court of Appeals Judge Rosenblatt “urge[d] the District Attorney to
undertake a fresh and unbiased review of the case and investigate fully all
the evidence.” 816 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (N.Y. 2004) (Rosenblatt, J., concurring).
He added that, even though the prosecution has fought the defendant in
court, “this is a particularly disquieting case, one that calls for a new and
fastidious layer of review. If on further investigation the District Attorney
shares these concerns, he has the power and, I am confident, the motivation,
to take whatever steps are appropriate to do justice.” Id.
283. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 159 (pointing to the standards that
prosecutors must follow under the ethical rules in determining whether to
conduct a further investigation after a conviction).
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B. The Mechanism that a Federal Court Can Use in
Determining Whether to Call for a Reinvestigation?
The basic outline of the Friedman mechanism for deciding
whether to call for a reinvestigation can be easily drawn from
the Second Circuit opinion. This includes the legal standard,
how a court should analyze the evidence in the petition, and
the quality and quantity of evidence needed to justify the call
for a reinvestigation. In addition, the opinion raises secondary
questions related to habeas law that also need to be considered:
the power of a district court to issue the call and the
availability of making the call in the context of a second or
successive petition. Each of these issues will be addressed in
this section.
Legal Standard. The Friedman court called for the
reinvestigation based on its conclusion that “new and material
evidence,” viewed in conjunction with the remaining evidence
in the record, “suggest[ed] a reasonable likelihood” that Jesse
Friedman was “wrongfully convicted.”284
From the opinion itself, it is clear that the new evidence
must be evidence that could not have been discovered prior to
the conviction.285 The Second Circuit described that “[t]he „new
284. Id. at 159-60.
285. It should be noted that a federal court‟s consideration of “newly
discovered evidence” in this context is not inconsistent with the Supreme
Court‟s recent decision in Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). In
Pinholster, the Court concluded that, in determining whether a state court‟s
decision was an “unreasonable application” of federal law under 28 U.S.C §
2254(d)(1), a habeas court is limited to the record that was before the state
court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Id. at 1398. Thus, under
Pinholster, a habeas court is limited in the evidence in the evidence it can
consider when deciding whether to grant habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C §
2254(d)(1) (“an application . . . shall not be granted with respect to any claim
that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to). The
question here is different and does not focus on the 2254(d) standard of
review. Rather, it only concerns what evidence a court can consider when
taking the less intrusive step in calling for a reinvestigation. There is nothing
in Pinholster that would prevent a habeas court from considering any “new
evidence” under those circumstances. Critically, the Supreme Court has
authorized a federal habeas court to consider “new evidence” when
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and material‟ evidence in [the] case [was] the post-conviction
consensus within the social science community that suggestive
memory recovery tactics can create false memories and that
aggressive investigation techniques like those employed in
petitioner‟s case can induce false reports.”286 Thus, the Second
Circuit did not view any of Jesse‟s claims of newly discovered
evidence—the suggestive techniques or the hypnosis—as newly
discovered. The court obviously viewed that evidence as
material—the court spent a good portion of its factual
discussion recounting the suggestive techniques, which
included the hypnosis.287 So its failure to mention this critical
evidence as part of the “new and material” evidence justifying
the reinvestigation suggests that the court did not believe that
it was truly newly discovered.
The other significant aspect of the standard is the focus on
a reasonable likelihood of a wrongful conviction. It sets a
relatively high bar for a call for reinvestigation. It clearly is
lower than the “high standard”288 that it would take to
establish a freestanding actual innocence claim. It also appears
to be lower than the Schlup standard, which asks whether it is
“more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”289 While
the Friedman test does seem to ask for the same type of
“probabilistic”290 assessment of the evidence as the Schlup test,
the ultimate question under Friedman is not as stringent as it
is in Schlup. A conclusion that no reasonable juror would have
convicted petitioner beyond a reasonable doubt is a demanding
question that searches for a high level of proof that petitioner
has established innocence. The Friedman standard has a
broader, and less demanding, analysis of whether there has
been a wrongful conviction. It looks more generally to whether

determining whether the petitioner had established a gateway innocence
claim. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2006).
286. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 160.
287. Id. at 146-48.
288. Dist. Attorney‟s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct.
2308, 2321 (2009).
289. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995).
290. Id. at 329. Accord House, 547 U.S. at 538.
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there are significant reasons to question the reliability of the
jury‟s determination on the question of guilt or innocence,
rather than determining that no juror would convict the
defendant. While still high, it does not ask as much as these
standards under other innocence-based theories.
The lower standard for the call for an investigation makes
sense. The call for a reinvestigation is far less intrusive into the
finality of the conviction and does not raise the same type of
federalism concerns as the innocence claims currently in
existence. The freestanding actual innocence claim will directly
void a conviction and end the criminal case entirely. Clearly,
such an intrusive act by a federal court into the finality and
autonomy of a state court proceeding should have the highest
standard. While not as intrusive as a freestanding actual
innocence claim, the Schlup test does provide for a gateway
into federal review of a state court conviction. The ultimate
resolution of that claim would be a federal court vacating a
state court conviction. As discussed before, the call for a
reinvestigation is far less intrusive. It does not have as direct
an impact on the finality of the conviction. Indeed, there is no
guarantee that any reinvestigation will result in any further
challenges to the conviction.291 Further, it does not raise the
same level of federalism concerns as it is solely asking for state
actors to potentially act to rectify an injustice on their own.292
Analysis of Evidence. In determining whether Jesse met
the standard, the Second Circuit accepted the factual
allegations set forth in the petition as true and then weighed
that evidence against the remaining evidence in the case. In its
detailed factual discussion, the court described much of what
happened in the investigation as true, even though that
evidence was not sworn testimony, but merely set forth in the
habeas petition itself, the affirmations in support of the
petition, or the transcripts of the documentary and its
associated interviews.293 The same can be said about how the
court discussed the prosecutor‟s and the court‟s actions in the

291. See Friedman, 618 F.3d at 161-62 (Raggi, J., concurring).
292. See id. at 160 (majority opinion).
293. Id. at 146-49.
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case.294 In fact, the concurring judge accused the majority of
doing just that, stating that the court simply “assume[d] the
truth of those facts or the misconduct of police officers,
prosecutors, defense counsel, and the presiding state court
judge before a hearing.”295 Similarly, the court accepted the
“social science consensus” in this case also without any sworn
expert testimony to establish its reliability.296
The analysis on a Friedman claim, therefore, does not
make an initial assessment of the credibility of the evidence. A
court accepts the allegations as true and determines whether
they are sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood of a
wrongful conviction. Once again, such an analysis is less
stringent than the Schlup standard, which requires the court
to make an initial assessment of the reliability of the
evidence.297 The Friedman court simply did not make such an
evaluation. After accepting the allegations in the petition as
true, the court then engaged in an assessment of all of the
evidence in the record as a whole to determine the likelihood of
a wrongful conviction.298 That represents the basic framework
that a court would use in assessing whether to make the call
for a reinvestigation.
Certainly, a court accepting the allegations in the petition
as true is a highly favorable analysis for a habeas petitioner.
That beneficial standard of review, however, is limited by the
amount or quality of evidence that would be needed to justify
the call for a reinvestigation. In justifying its actions, the court
stated that Jesse had come forward with “substantial evidence
that flawed interviewing techniques were used to produce a
flood of allegations.”299 There can be no doubt from reading the
opinion that Jesse presented a great deal of evidence in support
294. Id.
295. Id. at 161 (Raggi, J., concurring).
296. See id. at 160 (majority opinion).
297. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). The Second Circuit has
described the reliability analysis as “whether the new evidence is trustworthy
by considering it both on its own merits and, where appropriate, in light of
the pre-existing evidence in the record.” Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 161
(2d Cir. 2004).
298. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 157-60.
299. Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
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of his claim of innocence. Further, the evidence that was
presented—including statements from most of the people
involved in the criminal case—was substantial. Much of that
can be attributed to the investigation done by the filmmakers
in support of the documentary. It certainly will be unusual for
a habeas petitioner to come across such a wellspring of
compelling investigatory material after being convicted.
Nevertheless, it is logical that a call for a reinvestigation
from a court will look to whether “substantial evidence” has
been presented. A reinvestigation necessarily needs evidence to
support it. The more substantial the evidence presented—
either in terms of amount or character—the greater the
justification there will be for a call to expend the required
resources for the investigation. Similarly, the reinvestigation
will more likely be fruitful if the basis for that effort is
substantial evidence.
Unfortunately, the Friedman decision provides little
guidance on what type of evidence needs to be presented in
order to justify a call for a reinvestigation. The Second Circuit
stated that it had specifically considered the facts alleged in
the petition, the sworn affidavits, the transcript of the movie,
and the memoranda of interviews taken in preparation of the
film.300 In addition, the court looked to media coverage and
academic articles.301 As mentioned above, it represents a
substantial body of evidence. But the court did not indicate
that it was motivated to act on the basis of the type of evidence
that was presented. More importantly, there was no indication
that the court valued sworn statements in evaluating the
claims. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that a court probably
will not consider the evidence presented to be “substantial”
unless it is supported, at least in part, by sworn statements.302
300. Id. at 145.
301. Id. at 148, 151, 155-58.
302. Clearly, the court viewed a future § 440.10 motion raising an actual
innocence claims as the means to which Jesse would be able to vacate his
conviction, either on the basis of the evidence that he already had in his
possession or the evidence that would be developed during the
reinvestigation. See id. at 159. The Criminal Procedure Law requires that
any such motion based on “the existence or occurrence of facts . . . must
contain sworn allegations thereof . . . .” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1)
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What court can consider making a call for a
reinvestigation. In the Friedman decision, the court justified its
call for a reinvestigation by stating that an “appellate court
faced” with a disturbing record should not be a “silent
accomplice to what may be an injustice.”303 There is no
legitimate reason, however, to limit this authority to the circuit
court. The court did not provide one in Friedman. At most, it
seemed to suggest that an appellate court had an appellate
record on which to base its decision to call for a reinvestigation.
The “record” on which the Second Circuit based its conclusion,
however, appears to be the same factual record that was before
the district court. The court stated that its discussion of the
facts was based on the allegations in the petition as well as the
exhibits attached to that petition.304 Thus, the lower court was
in the same position to make an assessment as to whether a
call for a reinvestigation should issue.
Moreover, outside of its role in screening applications for
second or successive petitions, the circuit courts have no
greater powers in habeas cases than the district courts. The
habeas statutes provide district courts with the same authority
to grant relief as circuit judges. In fact, the district courts
review far more habeas cases than the circuit courts because
they are required to consider all of the first habeas petitions
filed by state inmates.305 The circuit courts only hear a small
number of those habeas cases should the petition meet the
demanding requirements for a certificate of appealability.306
There is no reason why, when considering injustice in habeas
cases, the power to make a call for a reinvestigation should be
limited to a circuit court. The district courts are in an
equivalent position to the circuit courts to consider whether a
call for a reinvestigation could be made under the Friedman
(McKinney 2004). This would also strongly suggest that any request for
reinvestigation must contain some sworn allegations of fact.
303. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 161.
304. Id. at 145.
305. Ryan Hagglund, Review and Vacatur of Certificates of Appealability
Issued After the Denial of Habeas Corpus Petitions, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 989,
994 (2005).
306. Id. (“[T]he [Supreme] Court has long permitted Congress to
significantly curtail a prisoner‟s right to appeal” a habeas denial.”).
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framework.
Under What Circumstances Should A Court Consider
Making a Call for a Reinvestigation. The court‟s decision in
Friedman provides a wide-range of possibilities under which a
court could consider making a call for a reinvestigation using
the Friedman framework.. In fact, there does not appear to be
any limit on when a court can consider making the call. In
Friedman, the court addressed the question of actual innocence
even though it was not the claim raised in the petition. In fact,
the actual claim raised in the petition was procedurally
defective and substantively meritless.307 Indeed, the court
concluded that it was not entitled to grant legal relief at all to
Jesse on a freestanding actual innocence claim—even if it
believed that Jesse had established his innocence under the
demanding freestanding actual innocence standard—because
Jesse had not properly exhausted such a claim in state court.308
Despite all of these limitations, the court engaged in its actual
innocence analysis.
The court leapt every hurdle in its way in deciding to call
for a new investigation. This means that, should another
federal court desire to make a call for a reinvestigation under
the mechanism set forth in Friedman, there are very few
roadblocks. The petition must allege in the first instance a
constitutional violation or the petition will be summarily
dismissed.309 Yet, as Friedman shows, the constitutional claim
need not detain the federal courts long. If the petitioner has
made a substantial showing similar to the one set forth in
Friedman, there would be grounds to consider making the call.
An interesting question here is whether the circumstances
in which a court could consider making a call for a
reinvestigation include an application to file a second or
successive petition. It can be assumed that some petitioners
will discover new and material evidence after they have
307. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 152-55.
308. Id. at 159.
309. See Rule 4, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (2004) (“If it plainly appears from
the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the
clerk to notify the petitioner.”).
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already lost their first petition. Unfortunately, the AEDPA
severely curtailed the ability of a petitioner to file a second or
successive petition. A claim presented in a second petition that
was raised in a previous petition must be denied.310 A claim
presented in a second petition that was not raised in a previous
petition must be denied unless there has been a retroactive
change in law or the factual predicate for the claim is newly
discovered.311 The habeas statute requires that a petitioner
seek authorization from the appropriate federal circuit court.312
That court can only grant authorization if the petitioner has
made a “prima facie showing that the application satisfies the
requirements of this subsection.”313
Even under these strict requirements for gaining
authorization to file a petition, there still would be room
available for the court to consider making the call. Friedman
shows that, no matter the obstacle to granting relief on the
underlying claim, a court would still be empowered to consider
whether a reinvestigation would be appropriate under the
Friedman framework. The circuit court can deny authorization
(just as Jesse was denied habeas relief in Friedman), but still
address whether or not a call to reinvestigate should be
issued.314
In fact, it would appear that considering a call for a
reinvestigation would be highly appropriate in these situations.
One of the grounds on which a petitioner can obtain
authorization to file a second or successive petition is on the
ground of newly discovered evidence. The statute requires that
310. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2006).
311. Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B).
312. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(A).
313. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(C).
314. An interesting side note is that the statute requires a court of
appeals to decide upon the application for authorization within thirty days
after the filing of the motion. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(D). However, even this
limitation would not stand in the way of a court addressing a Friedman
claim, which clearly would require more than thirty days to consider. The
Second Circuit has stated that it “may exceed the 30-day time limit . . . where
an issue requires a published opinion that cannot reasonably be prepared in
30 days.” Quezada v. Smith, 624 F.3d 514, 517 n.3 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Johnson v. United States, 623 F.3d 41, 43 n.3 (2010) (internal quotations
omitted)).
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“the factual predicate for the claim could not have been
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence.”315
“[T]he facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light
of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error,
no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty
of the underlying offense.”316 A petitioner only needs to make a
prima facie showing, however, which the Second Circuit does
not consider to be a very penetrating analysis.317 Nevertheless,
there does appear to be room here for a court to conclude that
this standard for gaining authorization may not be met, but the
factual allegations in the petition are enough for the court to
consider whether a call for a reinvestigation is appropriate.
Otherwise, where a petitioner does obtain authorization, this
would seem like the precise circumstance where a federal court
could consider making the call for a reinvestigation should the
court deny relief on the legal claim in the petition.318
315. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006).
316. Id. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).
317. Quezada, 624 F.3d at 521. Indeed, a petitioner does not need to
show that he is entitled to relief on the underlying legal claim or even
whether a federal court has the power to grant relief on the claim under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Id. This means that, even though it has not yet been
officially recognized, a petitioner can seek authorization pursuant to a
freestanding actual innocence claim. Thus, unless a petitioner has raised an
actual innocence claim in the first petition, a petitioner will be able to, at the
very least, put the innocence claim before the Second Circuit.
318. An interesting example of the authorization process is the Cole
case. According to the district court, the Second Circuit granted Cole
authorization to file a second or successive petition. Cole v. Walsh, No. 05CV-736, 2009 WL 3124771, at *1, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009). Because Cole‟s
legal claim—a freestanding actual innocence claim—clearly did not meet the
requirements of subsection (b)(2)(A), it means that authorization had to have
been granted on the factual predicate ground. Thus, it can be deduced that
the Second Circuit believed that Cole had at least made a prima facie
showing that, but for constitutional error, he is actually innocent by clear and
convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C) (circuit court may grant
authorization to file second or successive petition where petitioner has made
a “prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of the
subsection”); see also Quezada, 624 F.3d at 520. This would seem to be
enough to establish a Friedman actual innocence claim. However, as
discussed supra note 274, the district court judge never considered a
Friedman claim and, even worse, did not believe that Cole was even
“probably” innocent. Cole, 2009 WL 3124771 at *7. No notice of appeal was

61

688

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:2

Guilty Plea vs. Conviction After Trial. Despite the fact that
the call for a reinvestigation occurred in a case in which the
petitioner had pled guilty, this does not mean that a Friedman
claim is unavailable to a defendant who was convicted after
trial. That cannot be the case as the ends of justice would not
be served by limiting the claim to those defendants who plead
guilty. In fact, the opposite is true. This is self-evident in one
obvious way: a defendant who pleads guilty has, in nearly
every case, admitted to committing the crime. A defendant who
has gone to trial has maintained a plea of not guilty throughout
the case. In this regard, it is not surprising that the great
majority of exonerations in the DNA era have been in cases
where the defendant was convicted after trial.319 A conviction
after trial truly is the situation where a reinvestigation would
most likely have the greatest impact.
In fact, the debate really should be over whether a court
should even consider making a call for a reinvestigation in
those cases where a defendant has pled guilty. While strong
evidence of guilt, a guilty plea does not necessarily “preclude
the possibility of innocence.”320 Fortunately, the Second Circuit
settled this issue in Friedman itself—a call for an investigation
is an appropriate step in situations where the defendant has
pled guilty.321 But using Friedman as a guide, a petitioner in
ever filed. Even more tragic, it appears from the docket sheet that notice of
the court‟s opinion was served on counsel, but that notice was returned to the
court as a result of counsel‟s death. Thus, the notice of appeal does not appear
to have been filed because petitioner or his representative never received
notice of the decision. Since the entry of judgment occurred over 180 days
ago, even if petitioner sought to reopen the time to file a notice of appeal, the
request would have to be denied. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5).
319. Among the over 250 exonerations from DNA evidence, only thirteen
exonerations have occurred in cases where the defendant pled guilty. See
Know the Cases, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/k
now/Browse-Profiles.php (last visited Mar. 16, 2011) (1993 exoneration of
William Kelly, 1997 exoneration of Keith Brown, 1999 exoneration of
Anthony Gray, 2001 exonerations of John Dixon and Marcellius Bradford,
2006 exonerations of Eugene Henton and James Ochoa, 2007 exoneration of
Larry Bostic, 2008 exoneration of Steven Phillips (guilty plea only occurred
after two hung juries) and 2009 exonerations of Kathy Gonzalez, Debra
Shelden, Ada JoAnn Taylor, and Thomas Winslow).
320. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 141, at 512-13.
321. Indeed, it appears that the Second Circuit‟s reasoning was focused
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such a situation would most likely need to allege that he was
pressured into pleading guilty or that the plea was not
otherwise voluntary, knowing, or intelligent.322
Conclusion
There is no doubt that the situation in Friedman was quite
extraordinary. It is not every day that a critically-acclaimed
and influential documentary gets created about a criminal case
and, through the creation of that movie, a critical assessment
gets made of the fairness of the conviction. But while the case
was exceptional in many ways, Jesse Friedman clearly is not
the only person who can present compelling, new evidence of
innocence. Using the framework set forth in the Friedman
opinion, other federal courts should now consider whether to
make a call for a reinvestigation in the appropriate case.
“The great writ of habeas corpus has been for centuries
esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom.”323 However, no federal court has explicitly provided
relief to a habeas petitioner on the ground of actual innocence.
The Friedman decision represents a critical step forward in
habeas jurisprudence to address the persistent problem of
wrongful convictions. The call for a reinvestigation represents a
creative and prudent way for habeas courts to balance the

on why a reinvestigation was justified even though Jesse had pled guilty. It
reasoned that Jesse was pressured to plead guilty and was thus deprived of a
chance to challenge the evidence against him. Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d
142, 158 (2d Cir. 2010). However, the court‟s further reasoning that this case
was more troubling than a jury trial case where the court could take
“comfort” in the jury verdict, was nearly non-sensical and certainly illogical.
Id. at 158. It is far more justified for any court to take comfort in those cases
where the defendant has actually admitted to a crime rather than when a
defendant is convicted after a trial. Further, the standard that the court used
in Friedman applies equally to a case where there has been a jury verdict. A
court cannot take comfort in a jury verdict, even after all of the constitutional
process is afforded to the defendant, if there is “new and material” evidence
discovered after the trial that establishes a “reasonable likelihood” of a
wrongful conviction. That was the whole purpose of calling for a
reinvestigation in Friedman.
322. See Friedman, 618 F.3d at 158.
323. Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868).
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state‟s strong interest in finality against the need to right a
potential injustice. Although the number of petitions that will
present factual allegations sufficient to justify a call for a
reinvestigation under the Friedman framework will be small,
the existence of this new mechanism is an important safety
valve to ensure that legitimate claims of actual innocence get
the attention that they deserve.
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